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ABSTRACT 
 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) requires that employers 
provide a safe work environment for their employees. Many states have their own plans 
that follow federal guidelines and that are inclusive of law enforcement officers. Despite 
this, there are no federal—and few state—regulations that specifically apply to law 
enforcement. Although they are commonly found in other high-risk professions, expected 
practices for OSHA-consistent hazard analysis and mitigation do not exist in law 
enforcement. This thesis highlights the information that is necessary for policy 
administrators in this field to establish a systematic approach to safety. After reviewing 
how police departments can improve officer safety by applying OSHA standards, the 
thesis examines the fire service and the aviation and medical professions. Specifically, 
the thesis reviews how these professions have applied Dr. James Reason’s principles to 
create advanced safety systems in high-risk environments. Using OSHA guidelines and 
standards from other high-risk professions, the thesis constructs a roadmap that, if 
followed, produces a systematic approach that can create a culture of safety in law 
enforcement. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The concept of safety in law enforcement is subject to political pressure, poor 
information, and media and special interest influence. As the work for this thesis began, 
law enforcement suffered the aftermath of incidents in Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore; and 
New York City. Public cries of police militarization exerted pressure on elected officials 
and agency executives, which led to restrictions on safety equipment available to officers. 
As the work for this thesis drew to a close, the nation had gone on to suffer the Dallas 
police massacre, the vehicle ramming in New York City, and the Las Vegas sniper incident, 
and law enforcement had been criticized for responses to several school shootings. These 
events and others resulted in immediate purchases for improved law enforcement safety 
equipment like helmets and vests. The policy of restricting safety equipment for law 
enforcement ended, and discussions of police militarization began to fall silent.  
The first six months of 2018 saw a 24-percent increase in firearms-related officer 
line-of-duty deaths when compared to the same period in 2017.1 Over the past ten years, 
514 officer line-of-duty deaths have been the result of gunshots, compared to 364 deaths 
from traffic incidents and 325 from illness.2 Despite these data and the trend they represent, 
the law enforcement profession does not have the systematic approach to safety commonly 
found in other high-risk professions, and as required by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 (OSH Act). 
This thesis examines federal and state law concerning safety in the workplace. 
Despite a great deal of discussion inside the law enforcement profession on officer safety—
along with contributions from academia, elected officials and others—there is no process 
or system in place today to improve officer safety. Federal law enforcement is covered by 
                                                 








the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and many state and local law 
enforcement agencies are covered by OSHA equivalents at the state level. Despite this, 
there are no specific standards for law enforcement at the national level, and few at the 
state level. This leads many people in the field to believe they are exempt from the safety 
standards that apply to other high-risk professions. This thesis argues, however, that the 
General Duty Clause in the OSH Act requires law enforcement to follow the standards of 
OSHA in identifying hazards, mitigating those hazards and continually assessing safety 
hazards in the agency and profession. These steps are the first in establishing a necessary 
systematic approach to safety in law enforcement.  
This thesis reviews the fire service, and the aviation and medical professions—all 
high-risk professions that have adopted a systematic approach to safety. These professions 
have gone beyond the OSHA requirements and have adopted many of Dr. James Reason’s 
components of a safety system, which result in a culture of safety within an organization 
and profession. The lessons learned from OSHA requirements and other professions’ 
practices create a roadmap that, if followed, will allow law enforcement to make strides in 
improving officer safety.  
Law enforcement executives and elected officials can begin taking the steps 
necessary to create a systematic approach to safety; if they do not take these steps to create 
a safety culture now, the steps will be imposed on them. Civil attorneys who represent 
surviving family members of officers killed in the line of duty will soon realize this 
opportunity. Organizations that represent police officers, such as the Fraternal Order of 
Police and the Police Benevolent Association, will also begin to argue for improved safety 
systems.  
The roadmap developed in this thesis provides guidance for reducing political 
resistance and managing cost based on proven mitigation strategies. The roadmap also 
offers law enforcement the opportunity to improve professionalism by making officers 
safer on the job. Safer officers can make better decisions, as their actions are based on data 
and best practices that can be explained to a concerned public. The time to implement the 
roadmap is now—not when an outside entity dictates it. 
xix 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Continuing evolutions in terrorism, technology, social dynamics, and community 
expectations have created an ever-changing and hazardous environment for law 
enforcement officers. To ensure that law enforcement professionals can protect citizens 
and themselves, a systematic approach must be taken to identify current and future threats 
to an officer’s personal safety. Once a threat has been identified, risk mitigation strategies 
must be implemented and measured for continued effectiveness.  
The Occupation Safety and Health Act requires employers to provide employees 
with a work environment that is free—to the extent possible—of known hazards that can 
cause injury and death.1 The fire service and general industry are strictly regulated by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or its state equivalent. OSHA 
guidance assists employers to create systematic and measurable safety practices to ensure 
the health and wellbeing of employees in hazardous work environments.  
Law enforcement is included in many state OSHA plans but no specific guidelines 
or enforcement polices exist in ways commonly found in the fire service and general 
industry.2 The state of Indiana is one of twenty-two states and territories that have OSHA-
approved plans for workplace safety.3 Indiana specifically includes law enforcement as 
falling under its authority. For the purposes of this thesis, I use Indiana as an example to 
demonstrate common failures and opportunities that exist to improve law enforcement 
safety. 
Due to the lack of legal guidance found in other professions and industries, law 
enforcement has no systematic approach to safety. There are no requirements to keep 
1 OSH Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 654 §5, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document? 
p_table=OSHACT&p_id=3359. 
2 Indiana Department of Labor, “IN Review: Indiana Occupational Safety and Health 2009” (report, 
Indiana Department of Labor, March 2009), 13, http://www. 
in.gov/dol/files/03.27.2009_Final_Version.pdf. 
3 “State Plans,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), accessed April 4, 2016, 
https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/. 
2 
meaningful records on officers’ deaths and injuries.4 There are no state or national 
databases to identify trends or emerging threats.  
Two questions this thesis examines are: 
• Could existing state and federal OSHA guidelines that improve safety be 
applied to local law enforcement by utilizing a systematic approach to job 
hazard analysis and risk mitigation?  
• What can law enforcement learn from other public safety professions and 
general industry to improve hazard identification and risk mitigation? 
This thesis argues that it is time for law enforcement to adopt a systematic approach 
to safety that is robust enough to identify the hazards that exist today and anticipate those 
that will emerge in the future. OSHA compliance is a first step in that process. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review provides a brief background on OSHA and next examines the data 
available on police officers killed and injured in the line of duty. It concludes by reviewing 
how safety is managed in two other high-risk professions: aviation and medicine. 
1. OSHA Law 
Federal law concerning occupational safety is codified in the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970.5 The law was created to “prevent workers from being killed or 
otherwise harmed at work.”6 This law does not cover local and state law enforcement but 
does encourage states to create their own laws that meet minimal federal guidelines. To 
date, twenty-two states and territories have OSHA-approved programs.7 The state of 
Indiana has an approved plan and was researched to highlight the responsibilities of a state 
and its relationship with federal OSHA. 
                                                 
4 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing 
Officer Injuries: Final Report” (report, IACP, January 2014), http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/ 
IACP_ROI_Final_Report.pdf. 
5 OSH Act of 1970. 
6 OSHA, Workers’ Rights, OSHA 3021-11R 2016 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor), 
3, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf. 
7 OSHA, 5. 
3 
On September 26, 1986, the U.S. Department of Labor approved Indiana’s state 
plan.8 Indiana’s plan specifically states that Indiana Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (IOSHA) “adopts all OSHA regulations and standards identically.”9 
Indiana specifically identifies law enforcement as being covered by the state plan and 
groups it in state and local government for statistical purposes.10 Logically then, OSHA 
law applies to state and local law enforcement in Indiana but is enforced by the state. 
Despite this coverage, no specific state or federal rule applies to law enforcement. The 
law’s authors knew they could not address every occupation or specifically regulate every 
hazard.11 To provide proper guidance, the authors created the General Duty Clause to fill 
gaps that may exist between specific regulations. The General Duty Clause states, “Each 
employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment 
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm to his employees.”12 Even though hazards faced by law enforcement are not 
specifically acknowledged, the General Duty Clause requires departments to 
systematically mitigate identified hazards. As explained by Cam Merritt, “The General 
Duty Clause, then, serves as a kind of commonsense backstop that applies in cases where 
no specific standards exists.”13 
As a first step to a systematic process, OSHA promotes the use of a job hazard 
analysis to identify hazards.  
A job hazard analysis is a technique that focuses on job tasks as a way to 
identify hazards before they occur. It focuses on the relationship between 
the worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment. Ideally, when 
                                                 
8 IOSHA is the Indiana Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
9 “Indiana State Plan,” OSHA, accessed June 26, 2015, https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/stateprogs/ 
indiana.html. 
10 Indiana Department of Labor, “IN Review 2009,” 13. 
11 Cam Merritt, “What Is the OSHA General Duty Clause?” Chron, accessed June 26, 2015, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/osha-general-duty-clause-44765.html. 
12 OSH Act of 1970, General Duty Clause, 29 U.S.C. 654 § 5(a)(1)(2). 
13 Merritt, “General Duty Clause.” 
4 
uncontrolled hazards are identified, employers will take steps to eliminate 
or reduce them to an acceptable level of risk.14 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) released a report in 2014 
that attempted to apply the concept of the job hazard analysis to law enforcement. At the 
time of the writing of this thesis, the recommendations noted in the report have not been 
implemented to any detectable level within the profession.15 The study’s researchers 
tracked 1,295 injuries that occurred across eighteen agencies. The report concluded that, 
“despite these [research] efforts, little is known about the national scope of police officer 
injuries outside of line of duty deaths and assaults; as a result, relatively little is known 
about the impact of injuries on law enforcement agencies.”16 
2. Officers Killed and Injured in the Line of Duty 
Data on officers killed in the line of duty exist in various studies, articles, and 
websites, but none of these provide a comprehensive analysis on how officers are being 
killed and injured. A problem arises when trying to use this data as part of a job hazard 
analysis. For example, it is common for law enforcement experts to argue that officers are 
more at risk from accidents than felonious assault.17 But such arguments oversimplify the 
problem by identifying only two categories: “killed accidentally” and “killed feloniously.” 
In reality, threats to officers are much more varied than this, but the available data does not 
show an accurate picture of what is killing and injuring police officers. Non-existent, 
inaccurate, and manipulated data in law enforcement were found to be common. A study 
by the Major Cities Chiefs Association shows a significant rise in violent crime in large 
cities across the country in the years 2015 and 2016.18 Despite this, Wesley Bruer wrote 
                                                 
14 OSHA, Job Hazard Analysis, OSHA 3071 2002 (Revised) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2002), 1, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3071.pdf?utm_source=rss&utm_medium= 
rss&utm_campaign=job-hazard-analysis-13. 
15 IACP and Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Officer Injuries,” 7-8. 
16 IACP and Bureau of Justice Assistance, 16. 
17 Richard Ashton, “Predictable Is Preventable,” Police Chief, June 2015, www.policechief 
magazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2584&issue_id=12012. 
18 “Violent Crime Survey- Totals: Midyear Comparison between 2016 and 2015,” Major Cities Chiefs 
Association, July 29, 2016, 1-2, https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/mcca_violent_crime_ 
data_midyear_20162015.pdf. 
5 
that President Obama believed that violent crime was down.19 The one statistic that is 
beyond reproach is that police officers are being killed at a much higher rate. In 2016, sixty-
seven officers were shot and killed.20 This is a significant increase from the forty-three 
officers shot and killed the previous year.21 Gunshot fatalities fell to forty-six in 2017 but 
are up 28 percent in the first five months of 2018.22 
The National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund is perhaps the best source 
of data on officers killed in the line of duty. The National Law Enforcement Officers 
Memorial Fund maintains a website that keeps daily totals and brief descriptions of the 
incidents that result in an officer’s line-of-duty death.23 Of the 19,298 officers ever killed 
in the United States and inscribed on the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial as 
of 2012: 10,787 (56 percent) were due to firearms, 5364 (28 percent) were traffic-related, 
and 3,147 (16 percent) were due to other causes.24 Data is nearly nonexistent for officers 
injured in the line of duty. There is no single data source available to draw accurate 
conclusions on officer injuries and deaths. Dr. David Swedler of the University of Chicago 
has written several articles on occupational injuries and deaths, including law enforcement. 
In 2014, he observed that most previous studies on law enforcement line-of-duty deaths 
failed to include details of the incidents and circumstances that caused the officers death.25 
Swedler’s observations followed a report in 2012 by the Officer Safety and Wellness Group 
of the Bureau of Justice Assistance that recommended expanding data collection on the 
                                                 
19 Wesley Bruer, “Violent Crime Rising in U.S. Cities, Study Finds,” CNN, July 25, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/25/politics/violent-crime-report-us-cities-homicides-rapes/index.html. 
20 “Causes of Law Enforcement Deaths over Past Decade (2008-2017),” National Law Enforcement 
Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), updated March 15, 2018, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-
fatalities-data/causes.html. 
21 NLEOMF. 
22 “Preliminary 2018 Officer Fatalities,” NLEOMF, accessed June 6, 2018, http://www.nleomf.com/. 
23 NLEOMF, “Causes of Law Enforcement Deaths.” 
24 Office of Safety and Wellness (OSW) Group, “Officer Deaths and Injuries from Gunfire” (meeting 
summary, U.S. Department of Justice, January 2012), 4, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/OSWG/Meeting_ 
01-26-2012.pdf. 
25 David I. Swedler et al., “Occupational Homicide of Law Enforcement Officers in the US, 1996-
2010,” Injury Prevention 20, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 35, https://doi.org/10.1136/injuryprev-2013-040799. 
6 
national level.26 So far, there has been no  additional research or implementation steps 
toward this effort. 
According to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), “To date, there is very 
little national-level guidance on occupational health and safety responsibilities for U.S. law 
enforcement agencies; state and local programs often vary widely in structure and services 
provided.”27 Lacking this guidance, law enforcement agencies are not required to track or 
report officer injuries or the circumstances in which officers are injured and killed. Aside 
from data kept on officers’ deaths, little else is available to identify hazards or mitigation 
strategies. At the conclusion of their report, “Reducing Officer Injuries,” the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) noted that most injuries suffered by law 
enforcement officers are not recorded in any database that is sufficient for developing 
proper mitigation strategies or research. They encourage agencies to develop a culture of 
safety and viewed injury tracking as a positive first step.28 
3. Systematic Approaches to Safety in Other Industries and Professions 
James Reason is a professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Manchester, in the United Kingdom. He has written extensively on the need for high-risk 
organizations to adopt what he calls a “safety culture.” His primary message is that an 
organization’s entire safety system and culture must be addressed to improve safety.29 
Dr. Reason argues that humans are prone to error and that safety systems are 
necessary to compensate for the known limitations of people in high-risk occupations. His 
research indicates that employers commonly address errors using the “person approach”; 
                                                 
26 Darrel Stephens, Mora Fiedler, and Steven Edwards, OSW Group Annual Summary: Issues and 
Recommendations Discussed for Improving the Wellbeing of Police Officers (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2012), 18, http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0673-pub.pdf. 
27 Elizabeth Sandberg et al., A Guide to Occupational Health and Safety for Law Enforcement 
Executives (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, September 2010), 36, www.valorfor 
blue.org/Documents/Publications/Public/A-Guide-to-Occupational-Health-and-Safety-for-Law-
Enforcement-Executives.pdf. 
 28 IACP and Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Officer Injuries,” 6. 
29 James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 
121-22. 
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they name, blame, and shame the employee in the hope that the error will not reoccur.30 
Dr. Reason suggests that a “system approach” is necessary to fix the problem. The system 
approach is focused on the conditions and environment in which the employee works and 
how to build defenses to prevent errors. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has applied Dr. Reason’s research to 
create the Operator’s Manual: Human Factors in Airport Operations.31 The manual 
describes how errors are created and how best to prevent them using a system approach. It 
is consistent with the job hazard analysis suggested by OSHA and may be informative for 
law enforcement. 
The medical community has created the Incident Decision Tree as a tool to separate 
human errors from system errors. The concept is to apply a systematic review process after 
an error has occurred. The model looks at the act itself, environmental factors, impairment, 
training, and policies to determine where gaps may exist in the safety system. Even though 
discipline and termination are possible, the focus is on training and remediation.32 This 
would be a significant departure from most law enforcement agencies, which are rule 
oriented and use negative discipline to correct errors. 
The research indicates that the aviation industry and the medical profession are well 
ahead of law enforcement in the area of safety management. Existing research has 
generally pointed to the need for improvement without any collective agreement or action. 
By looking at the existing law and leveraging what other professions are currently doing, 
future research should provide direction. A system approach to safety encourages 
addressing the entire system and culture. Such an approach may reduce injury and death to 
law enforcement officers. No research is available that has specifically addressed the need 
                                                 
30 James Reason, “Human Error: Models and Management,” BMJ 320, no. 7237 (2000): 768-770. 
31 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Operator’s Manual: Human Factors in Airport 
Operations(Washington, DC: FAA, September 2007). 
32 Sandra Meadows, Karen Baker, and Jeremy Butler, “The Incident Decision Tree: Guidelines for 
Action Following Patient Safety Incidents,” in Advances in Patient Safety: Form Research to 
Implementation, Vol. 4, edited by Kerm Henriksen, James B. Battles, Eric S. Marks, and David I. Lewin 
(Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2005), 394, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
books/NBK20586. 
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for law enforcement to be held to the same standard of safety commonly found in general 
industry and the fire service. 
When contrasting the fire service with law enforcement, the research is clear that 
the fire service receives vastly more attention in the area of personal safety. Most of the 
OSHA standards that pertain to firefighting can be found in 29 CFR section 1910 in the 
OSHA standards of general industry. This section covers such things as fire prevention, 
detection systems, personal protective equipment, and extinguishers. A quick internet 
search returns multiple replies offering training to firefighters to ensure they are OSHA 
compliant. 
In addition to OSHA, most fire departments follow standards established by the 
U.S. Fire Administration and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).33 An 
example of the emphasis placed on personal safety in the fire service can be found in the 
after-action reports generated after the Sofa Super Store fire in South Carolina that occurred 
on June 18, 2007.34  Nine Charleston firefighters lost their lives in this single event. A 
large furniture store was engulfed in flames, and several firefighters became trapped inside. 
Captain Chris Villarreal was on scene and said that a “significant number of his fellow 
firefighters either retired or left the department in the aftermath of this horrific event.”35 
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) published a massive two-
volume review of the fire with a specific interest on safety and lessons learned from the 
incident.36 A second review was conducted by the National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH). This review recommended improvement in things like written 
standard operating procedures, use and enforcement of the Incident Command System 
                                                 
33 The U.S. Fire Administration is a FEMA agency. 
34 Richard Gasaway, “Charleston Sofa Super Store: An Unfiltered Perspective,” Fire Engineering, 
November 23, 2009, http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/2009/11/charleston-sofa-super.html. 
35 Gasaway 
36 “NIST Manuscript Publication Search,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 14, 
2011, http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub_id=908200. 
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(ICS), communications, and resource accountability, to name just a few.37 No comparable 
published effort could be found for law enforcement with a singular focus on safety. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research for this thesis focused on high-risk professions and organizations that 
discuss safety as a major component of their daily operations. Laws, policies, and best 
practices were reviewed to determine their application and ease of implementation in law 
enforcement.  
1. Object or Sample 
My research included two areas of effort. The first identified law enforcement 
agencies, other public safety agencies, and general industries that utilize a systematic 
approach to safety. Some of this research included analyzing existing case studies to 
identify entire professions or industries that have an extended history of using safety 
systems to reduce deaths and injuries that occur in relation to their occupation. A primary 
focus included the fire service, the airline industry, and the medical profession. 
The second area of effort was a policy review to determine what doctrines currently 
exists in law enforcement that supports a systematic approach to safety. The state of Indiana 
was specifically highlighted as an example of what currently exists in law, policy and 
practice. Other state and federal laws, policies, and practices were also reviewed to identify 
what is working and what needs to be improved. The federal government does not regulate 
safety beyond the federal level, and each state determines its own safety standards. This 
further necessitates focus on one state when compiling lessons learned and 
recommendations for improvement. 
                                                 
37 “Death in the Line of Duty…A Summary of NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation,” Centers 




The first phase of research involved identifying the safety systems that currently 
exist in public safety and general industry.38 I included in this effort a review of the issues 
that existed prior to the systematic approach that necessitated a change in the status quo. I 
also followed the implementation steps and noted the challenges that existed during this 
process. Finally, I reviewed the overall performance of the system today. 
The second phase of research focused on existing laws, policies, and practices that 
support or hinder a systematic approach to safety for law enforcement. I began  at the 
federal level and reviewed how regulators, policy makers, and practitioners interpret the 
same laws and policies. I identified documented differences that exist between other public 
safety professions and general industry when measured against what is found in law 
enforcement. 
The third phase of research focused on previously published recommendations 
concerning systematic approaches to law enforcement safety. I have included a review of 
why these recommendations were suggested, their current status of implementation, and 
what resistance or challenges they have experienced. 
3. Limits 
This research focused on identifying safety systems in use by public safety and 
general industry. Why law enforcement is not held to the same standard as other 
professions is specifically excluded beyond identifying potential implementation 
challenges. Such a discussion would be based on opinion, politics, and public relations. 
Specific tactics and equipment reviews were also excluded. Though some safety equipment 
examples are included, they exist to identify policy and practice inconsistencies or legal 
voids. 
                                                 
38 “General industry” is a term used by OSHA to identify private-sector, or non-government, 
occupations that are covered by safety laws. These may include construction, manufacturing, and mining as 
examples.  
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Some of this research necessarily included social issues that exist concerning law 
enforcement. Arguments on issues such as police militarization or general use of force are 
excluded from this research in terms of conclusions or recommendations. General social 
issues of note are included when necessary. 
4. Data Sources 
The research for this thesis was necessarily broad in its scope. Academic works, 
laws and codes, written policies, and published post-incident reports all provide the 
background and framework necessary to determine the current existence and success of 
systematic safety programs. Since law enforcement is social in nature, some of this research 
may include opinion, political position, and various perceptions of law enforcement in 
general. 
Request for information were made to organizations and subject matter experts to 
obtain existing policies and data related to organizational safety. Agency officials and 
experts provided existing policy statements, processes, and reporting requirements that 
promote safety. 
5. Type and Mode of Analysis 
I conducted policy modeling for my thesis using much of the Bardach approach to 
policy analysis.39 When appropriate, I included forms of case studies and agency reviews 
in my research. Published case studies, legal reviews, and policy research were used to gain 
an understanding of the current environment or perceived social context of law 
enforcement safety systems. 
Based upon Bardach’s process, I used the following steps: 
1. Define the problem 
2. Assemble some evidence 
3. Review alternatives and what exists today 
                                                 
39 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012). 
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4. Project a recommended path to improved safety through a systematic 
process 
5. Project the outcomes of implementing the suggested policy or process 
6. Confront the trade-offs of the suggested policy or process with what is 
being done today 
7. Decide: based on all available evidence, is the recommended solution 
achievable, desirable and an improvement to the existing environment? 
8. Tell the story of law enforcement safety in the future.40 
The metrics I used when comparing my recommendations and the status quo 
included cost, legality, political acceptance, level of effort, and effectiveness. These areas 
are common at the center of any government decision-making process and law enforcement 
is not an exception. The final recommended solution must achieve an acceptable balance 
among these factors to be realistic and applicable to the law enforcement profession in 
general. 
The thesis concludes with a workable and defensible recommendation based on 
proven safety systems in use today and their nexus to law enforcement. The research and 
implementation of works completed by Dr. James Reason is specifically highlighted. 
Along with OSHA standards, Reason’s work demonstrates the success of other high-risk 
professions in creating safety systems and safety cultures. 
6. Output 
The finished product of my analysis includes a policy modeling of the 
recommended approach to reduce law enforcement deaths and injuries by implementing a 
systematic approach to safety. The reader is left with defensible justifications for 
implementing the recommended changes to the existing status quo. The reader is also 
provided with an implementation roadmap that considers successes and challenges that 
have been identified in other public safety organizations and general industry as they have 
migrated to the use of safety systems. The reader will understand that safety is a process 
                                                 
40 Bardach. 
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that is best managed by a system instead of on- time solutions or passionate reactions to 
tragedy.  
C. SUMMARY 
This review intends to provide a frame of reference to the concept of safety. Law 
enforcement lacks most of the protections found in the fire service, medical, and airline 
industries and most other high-risk occupations. This thesis attempts to draw lessons from 
these other industries and occupations. What emerges is a step-by-step plan for law 
enforcement to follow to improve officers’ safety, ensure adaptability to the changing 
threats of homeland security, and create a system that is sustainable and accountable. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II is a review of how OSHA law could be applied to law enforcement. The 
chapter includes a projection of how law enforcement would benefit if it were held to the 
same systematic standards as the fire service and other hazardous professions. Chapter III 
explores how law enforcement should implement the job hazard analysis as detailed by 
OSHA. The step-by-step systematic process could immediately improve officer safety if 
implemented. The approaches of Dr. James Reason are explored for their applicability to 
law enforcement in Chapter IV. Chapter IV reviews how the fire service, aviation, and the 
medical profession have successfully applied Reason’s concepts and move beyond basic 
OSHA compliance. Chapter V creates a vision of the future of law enforcement if the 
system is implemented. A roadmap is detailed for elected officials, agency executives, and 
academics to follow to improve safety. A comparison of doing nothing and the impact of 
the systematic approach is included. The assessment includes cost, legality, political 
acceptance, level of effort, and effectiveness.  
14 
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II. OSHA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: CURRENT PRACTICES 
AND ALTERNATIVES 
The most significant challenge when arguing that the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) guidelines apply to law enforcement is the complete lack 
of knowledge by police administrators.41 I will use the state of Indiana as an example to 
further the discussion of OSHA and law enforcement safety.  
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was created: 
To assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and 
women; by assisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to assure 
safe and healthful working conditions; by providing for research, 
information, education, and training in the field of occupational safety and 
health.42 
The OSHA Workers’ Rights publication of 2014 goes on to say: 
Worker Protection is the Law of the Land 
You have the right to a safe workplace. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 (OSH Act) was passed to prevent workers from being killed or 
otherwise harmed at work. The law requires employers to provide their 
employees with working conditions that are free of known dangers.43 
The discussion of OSHA state or non-OSHA state takes shape later in the same document: 
State and Local Government Workers 
Employees who work for state and local governments are not covered by 
Federal OSHA, but have OSH Act protections if they work in those states 
that have an OSHA-approved state plan. The following 22 states [see Table 
1] or territories have OSHA-approved programs.44 
                                                 
41 Rarely does an OSHA reference, or other recognized safety standards, appear in police literature or 
police statements. 
42 OSHA, Workers’ Rights. 
43 OSHA, 3. 
44 OSHA, 6. 
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Table 1.   States with OSHA-Approved Programs45 
Alaska Arizona  California  Hawaii Indiana 
Iowa  Kentucky Maryland Michigan Minnesota 
Nevada  New Mexico North Carolina Oregon  South Carolina  
Tennessee Utah Vermont  Virginia Washington 
Wyoming Puerto Rico    
 
The U.S. Department of Labor gave final approval to the Indiana Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (IOSHA) plan on September 26, 1986. Under the unique 
plan standards, Indiana declares that, “IOSHA adopts all OSHA regulations and standards 
identically.”46 To determine what standards apply to Indiana, it becomes necessary to once 
again refer to the OSHA requirements. Indiana groups local law enforcement in the state 
and local government category for reporting and statistical purposes. This includes police, 
firefighters, healthcare workers, educators, and elected officials.47 The same publication 
describes the uniqueness of police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians/
paramedics by stating, 
individuals that work in these occupations work to maintain order, enforce 
laws and protect lives in some of the most dangerous situations. Because 
the work of emergency responders is inherently dangerous, managing their 
safety can be more accurately described as managing their level of risk.48 
Despite this level of concern, there are no specific standards that address police 
officer safety. This lack of specific standards leads many police administrators to believe 
that OSHA does not apply to law enforcement. In states like Indiana, they could not be 
more wrong. 
                                                 
45 Source: OSHA, 6. 
46OSHA, “Indiana State Plan.” 
47 Indiana Department of Labor, “IN Review 2009,” 13. 
48 Indiana Department of Labor, 14. 
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The General Duty Clause applies to every employer and employee covered by the 
law.49 
For all the standards that OSHA has issued over the years, the agency 
acknowledges that there is no way it could ever identify and regulate every 
single hazard in every workplace. The General Duty Clause, then, serves as 
a kind of commonsense backstop that applies in cases where no specific 
standard exists. To give an obviously absurd example, imagine that you 
owned a warehouse and that your janitors swabbed down the floors with 
vegetable oil every morning, leaving them extremely slick. There’s no 
OSHA regulation that specifically identifies this practice as dangerous. But 
you could still wind up fined for maintaining an unsafe workplace because 
a floor coated in oil is an obvious hazard.50 
Using this quote as an example, the mitigation strategy is to stop putting vegetable 
oil on the floor. This could be easily accomplished since the warehouse manager controls 
the environment and the policy that guides the janitor’s actions. For law enforcement, this 
is where the challenge begins. The law enforcement administrator does not control the 
environment in which the officer works. As a result, there is no safety policy that can 
prevent officers from being shot by those who would do them harm. For many police 
administrators, this is where the discussion normally stops. In reality, this is where it should 
begin. For guidance, the police administrator should turn to the fire service. 
A. COMPARING OSHA STANDARDS FOR POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS 
1. Fire Service 
Since OSHA was established, it has been noticeably silent on specific public safety 
agencies. This may be due to the fact that OSHA does not cover local government 
employees as mentioned earlier. If this is true, then the states that follow OSHA guidelines 
should develop their own standards since they are lacking at the national level. Even with 
this lack of attention, just a small amount of time researching the issue will reveal that the 
fire service is far better protected, and more comfortable, with the OSHA standards in 
place. Most of the standards pertaining to firefighting can be found in 29 CFR 1910 of the 
                                                 
49 OSHAct, General Duty Clause, 5(a)(1)(2). 
50 Merritt, “What Is the OSHA General Duty Clause.” 
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OSHA standards of General Industry. This section covers everything from evacuation 
routes, fire prevention, detection systems, extinguishers, and personal protective 
equipment. A quick internet search reveals multiple training opportunities designed to 
ensure that a fire department is compliant with OSHA standards. 
Beyond OSHA, most fire departments follow standards set by the U.S. Fire 
Administration, the National Fire Academy, and the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA).51 An example of firefighting standards and the review process is illustrated in the 
after-action reports generated after the Sofa Super Store fire in South Carolina that occurred 
on June 18, 2007.52 This single event resulted in the deaths of nine firefighters and stands 
as a benchmark event in the profession. Both NIST and NIOSH conducted reviews. Both 
reports were extensive by most standards and included building codes, sprinkler systems, 
water pressure, incident command, ventilation, and fuel to name just a few.53 
2. Law Enforcement 
An exhaustive search of OSHA standards that apply specifically to law enforcement 
reveals that there are none. However, this is not to say that OSHA does not apply to law 
enforcement. The fact is that standards that apply to the police are more of a two- or three-
step process to make the connection. For example, the biggest OSHA discussion in law 
enforcement in recent years concerned the wearing of a reflective vest while working in 
the roadway, such as directing traffic at a crash scene. The original intent of this standard 
was geared toward construction worker safety and it is there that the greatest impact was 
felt. Almost as an afterthought, so it seemed, someone asked the question if the standard 
applied to law enforcement. The answer was yes.54 Another example of law enforcement 
being required to follow OSHA standards can be found when officers wear an air-purifying 
                                                 
51 The U.S. Fire Administration is a FEMA agency. 
52 Gasaway, “Charleston Sofa Super Store.” 
53 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Death in the Line of Duty.” 
54 Jeffry Carter and Julie Alexander, “Reflective Vest Interpretation Letter” (letter, Indiana 
Department of Labor, December 2008), 3, http://www.in.gov/dol/files/Reflective_Vests_interpretation_ 
letter_12_12_08.pdf. 
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respirator, often referred to incorrectly as a gas mask.55 These are commonly seen during 
disturbances that involve the use of riot control agents, exposures to hazardous materials, 
and weapons of mass destruction. 
So why are there so few safety regulations to protect law enforcement when 
compared to the fire service? The disparity appears to be because fire is based on science, 
while law enforcement is not. A simple review of the Sofa Super Store incident in 
Charleston, South Carolina, after action reports referenced earlier gives even the layperson 
an appreciation of fire science and the ability of investigators to re-create a fire in the 
laboratory. Given the right information, this makes a fire predictable and even 
mathematical. It is not having all of the information during the incident that makes fires 
extremely dangerous and deadly. In fact, since it is impossible to know everything at the 
scene, some are beginning to argue that the fire service should refrain from working inside 
of a structure during a fire except in extreme circumstances.56 
3. What Law Enforcement Can Do Today 
So, what can law enforcement learn from the fire service? Most professional police 
agencies do after action reports following major incident and events. Exceptionally well-
prepared reports are hard to find, however. The best reports only seem to emerge after a 
significant loss of life or an incident that generates exceptional public interest. An example 
of this would be the May Day report done by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 
in 2007.57 This report stands out because LAPD identified errors in command, 
communication, training, and use of force and produced a publicly available report. This 
allows other agencies to learn from their experience. 
                                                 
55 OSHAct, 29 C.F.R. 1910.134. 
56 “OSHA Instituting Regulations to Stop Firefighter from Making Interior Attacks,” Call the Cops, 
April 17, 2014, http://www.callthecops.net/osha-instituting-regulations-stop-firefighter-making-interior-
attacks/. 
57 Michael Hillmann and Gerald Chaleff, “Los Angeles Police Department Report to the Board of 
Police Commissioners: An Examination of May Day 2007” (report, Los Angeles Police Department, 
October 2007), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Final_Report.pdf. 
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Recently, the Department of Justice (DoJ) has stepped in to conduct several high-
profile civil rights investigations of individual officers and their departments after incidents 
that generated public interest.58 Even though these reports can be informative and guide 
other agencies on supposed best practices, they fall far short of the science found in the fire 
reports. Most of these reports focus on things such as racism, community policing, mental 
health, and general community complaints.59 There is little or no discussion of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), tactics, staffing levels, or response plans. Though many try to 
stretch DoJ findings to best practices, they fall short if they do not address safety concerns 
of the officer and the citizens they are trying to protect. The DoJ report released after the 
Ferguson incident in March of 2015 made thirteen recommendations to improve policing 
in the city of Ferguson, Missouri.60 Of those, none suggested how to improve the safety of 
the officers. The final report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 
released in May 2015, does mention the safety of officers. Pillar Six is dedicated to officer 
wellness and safety.61 Many of their recommendations are consistent with arguments made 
or supported in this thesis. However, no mention of OSHA, legal requirements, or mandates 
are included in their recommendations. Without an acknowledgment that agency 
administrators are required to act by law or mandate, progress will be slow or absent. 
The fact is that the science of policing is not mathematical. Law enforcement deals 
with human behavior. This is also why discussions of police militarization are harmful to 
                                                 
58 This is not a new concept. However, the DoJ is now far more public in its review and receives 
extensive media coverage. Many now look to the DoJ as the regulator of local law enforcement. 
59 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department” (report, DoJ, March 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf; Jocelyn Samuels and Damon 
Martinez, “Department of Justice Investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department,” U.S. Department 
of Justice, April 10, 2014, 1, www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-
14.pdf; United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Investigation of the New Orleans 
Police Department” (report, DoJ, March 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf. 
60 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Ferguson,” 90-96. 
61 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, “Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing” (report, DoJ, 2015), 61-68, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_ 
FinalReport.pdf. 
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the public and law enforcement without an understanding of safety and the hazards found 
in the police officer’s work environment.62 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
With the OSH Act of 1970, the U.S. federal government took a significant step 
forward to improve the safety of workers. Individual states were encouraged to create their 
own safety guidelines that were at least as restrictive as the federal guidelines. Industries 
such as construction, manufacturing, firefighting, aviation, and medicine have made 
significant improvements in safety because of this guidance.  
This chapter highlights the fact that, despite the success of the OSH Act in other 
professions, law enforcement has been left behind. Since law enforcement is often thought 
of as a social endeavor, improving safety has mostly focused on the actions of the officer 
and the relationship an agency has with a given community. Though necessary in the larger 
discussion of policing, such discussion do little to promote real safety. This chapter 
highlights the need for law enforcement to develop and implement a systematic approach 
to safety. This approach should be based on the proven success of professions using the 
principles of the OSH Act. 
  
                                                 
62 There is no formal definition of police militarization. It most commonly refers to how officers 
dress, the equipment they use and tactics that some argue can undermine police-community relationships. 
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III. APPLYING THE OSHA JOB HAZARD ANALYSIS AND 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
Any discussion of keeping police officers safe should begin with the OSHA job 
hazard analysis. 
A job hazard analysis is a technique that focuses on job tasks as a way to 
identify hazards before they occur. It focuses on the relationship between 
the worker, the task, the tools, and the work environment. Ideally, after you 
identify uncontrolled hazards, you will take steps to eliminate or reduce 
them to an acceptable risk level.63 
Most professional police agencies have job descriptions that explain the expected 
role and activities to be performed for every position in the department. This may be a good 
place to start, but it is far short of a job hazard analysis. Even though most departments 
expect all officers to be able to function as an officer on patrol, the fact is the hazards faced 
by dissimilar assignments are very different. The street patrol officer faces hazards that the 
crime analyst does not. The bomb technician needs additional procedures, training, and 
protective equipment that the bicycle officer does not. 
This chapter explores OSHA’s five-step job hazard analysis and how it can be 
applied to law enforcement. The chapter continues with an example of using the hazard 
analysis to identify a significant threat to law enforcement officer’s safety. The chapter 
concludes by systematically mitigating the identified hazard. This process provides the 
foundation of a roadmap law enforcement can follow to create a systematic approach to 
safety and a safety culture in the profession. 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION OF THE JOB HAZARD 
ANALYSIS 
So where does a police administrator begin to conduct a job hazard analysis? OSHA 
provides guidance in Publication 3071, Job Hazard Analysis, which suggests a five-step 
process to begin the job hazard analysis.64 
                                                 
63 OSHA, Job Hazard Analysis, 1. 
64 OSHA, 4-5. 
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1. Involve Your Employees 
It seems everyone these days thinks they know what the job of a police officer 
entails. Sadly, too many people get their information from Hollywood and the media. In 
most cases, it is only the officer doing the job and the officer’s immediate supervisor who 
understand the hazards faced by officers today. Many older veteran administrators recall 
their own days on the street years ago to identify hazards, and that is completely misguided. 
To understand the current hazards, the job hazard analysis must include input and 
acceptance from the officers doing the task.  
2. Review Your Accident History 
Professional police agencies are nearly fanatical about keeping statistics. They 
often report crime statistics and trends, such as, “Homicides are down and robberies up. 
Overall, crime is down.” These statements are designed to make the community feel safe 
and portend that things are improving. What is rarely, if ever, reported is the injury and 
mortality rate of the officers performing the job. Most law enforcement agencies do a 
decent job of documenting duty-related injuries. Few, however, use that information to 
identify trends and make adjustments in policy, training, and tactics. For large departments, 
it would not be uncommon for 5 percent to 10 percent of the force to be off duty or assigned 
to limited duty due to injury and illness. Additionally, law enforcement is generally far 
behind the fire service in documenting exposures to hazardous situations. This would 
include hazardous materials, criminals in possession of firearms, and, vehicle operations 
to name a few. Most of these incidents are documented as a whole but do not include the 
specific information to mitigate the hazard in the future.65 It also makes it nearly 
impossible for an officer to identify the cause of an illness or injury that presents itself 
years after an event. 
3. Conduct a Preliminary Job Review 
Statistics are a great source to identify trends and the measurable impact that 
hazards cause on a department’s workforce. However, the best information is only received 
                                                 
65 IACP and Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Officer Injuries,” 19-34. 
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from the employees doing the work. The employees will know all of the bumps and bruises 
that go unreported. They will also be able to discuss the near misses that did not result in 
injury or death but very well could have.66 The employees may share workarounds to 
policy or trained tactics that do not work or impair productivity or safety. In the police 
world, this is best symbolized by the veteran officer telling the rookie, “Forget all of that 
stuff you learned in the academy. This is how we do it on the street.” Nothing should 
concern a police administrator more than to find out that their training, policies, and 
expectations are not being transferred to actual performance on the street. Such a situation 
does not necessarily indicate that officer has gone rogue. It is possible that an officer’s 
actions are an attempt to improve safety and is actually ahead of policy and training. This 
would indicate that policies need to be rewritten and training updated. 
The authors of the OSHA Job Hazard Analysis emphasize one point during the job 
review. “If any hazards exist that pose an immediate danger to an employee’s life or 
health, take immediate action to protect the worker.”67 This, in some instances, would 
take a monumental effort by agency executives. Training cycles and budgets generally run 
annually. To purchase protective equipment in bulk or conduct immediate training would 
be costly and time consuming for a large agency. This was most evident in Dallas, Texas, 
in 2017 when five Dallas police officers were killed by a suspect with a rifle on July 7.68 
Governor Greg Abbott of Texas scrambled to find $1 million to outfit police officers with 
helmets and vests that would protect against rifle fire. Governor Abbott said, “What the 
attack in Dallas last year showed is that more needs to be done to protect the brave men 
and women who run into danger and not away from it.”69 It was further estimated that to 
equip each of the 77,000 police officers in Texas with a rifle-resistant vest, costing $500 
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apiece, would cost $38,500,000.70 Despite this cost, the protection of the employee is 
paramount and required by law.  
4. List, Rank, and Set Priorities for Hazardous Jobs 
Not all hazards pose the same risk for employees and not all identified issues can 
be solved at once. Those hazards that are likely to result in serious injury or death should 
be addressed first. Those hazards that frequently reoccur should also be prioritized. As 
mentioned earlier, law enforcement is a hazardous profession. The intent is to eliminate 
unacceptable risks and mitigate hazards to the best of our ability. 
5. Outline the Steps or Task 
The OSHA documentation suggests that most jobs can be broken down into job 
tasks or steps. While this is true with most things in law enforcement, it is not as simple as 
completing a checklist of things to do to avoid risk. The dynamic nature of high-risk 
situations makes it very challenging to create a specific process for each type of incident 
or event. This is due to the human element that does not perform like a mathematical 
process. Despite this, there are proven procedures, tactics, and equipment that afford 
officers the safest environment possible to perform their tasks. Through the job hazard 
analysis, all parts of the safety system can by identified and improved.  
B. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION: IDENTIFYING THE GREATEST 
THREAT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
Using the principles that dictate identifying and mitigating the most significant 
hazards first, the systematic process turns to identifying the causes of police officer 
fatalities. For years, law enforcement believed that more officers are killed in accidents 
than by felonious assault. The graph in Figure 1 shows how this trend has changed in recent 
years. 
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Figure 1.  Comparison of Officers Killed Accidentally and Feloniously between 
1987 and 201171 
Two things are apparent when looking at the data in the graph. The first is that more 
officers are killed accidentally than feloniously; according to this sample data, 64 percent 
of the officers killed accidentally died in auto and motorcycle crashes.72 This is where 
most of law enforcement’s energy has been placed in recent years. Statistics such as these 
are cited to encourage officers to reduce their speed and wear seatbelts. Second, for the 
first time in the years studied, more officers died feloniously than by accident in 2011. 
When reviewing statistics, academic research, or professional journals, it is rare to find 
data being used to mitigate felonious deaths for police officers. It is more often used to 
highlight a concern or trend but rarely to point to a specific mitigation strategy. Using data 
to mitigate accidental deaths of officers is more common. When applying this to felonious 
deaths, a completely different picture emerges. 
By using the principle of identifying and mitigating the most serious hazards first, 
I have changed the data set from the broad categories of accidental and felonious deaths to 
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only the highest two categories as recorded by the National Law Enforcement Officers 
Memorial Fund website, as shown in Figure 2.73 I have also included officers who were 
struck by vehicles in the same time period.74 
 
Figure 2.  Officers Killed by Auto Crash, Shot, and Struck by Vehicle 
2005-201475 
When viewing the data in this format, it becomes clear that in the ten years 
reviewed, more officers were killed by being shot than in auto accidents.76 In fact, of the 
19,298 officers on the National Law Enforcement Memorial in 2012: 10,787 (56 percent) 
were due to firearms, 5364 (28 percent) were traffic-related, and 3147 (16 percent) were 
due to other causes.77 
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Despite this, very few police administrators or academics invest the time or funding 
to systematically review this data and attempt to mitigate officers being shot as compared 
to auto crashes.78 Officers being struck by vehicles is another major topic of discussion in 
law enforcement circles. The data clearly show that this is not nearly the threat to officer’s 
lives when compared to being shot. In fact, of the 123 officers struck by a vehicle, many 
of them were feloniously struck, meaning they were intentionally hit. One data set indicates 
that possibly two-thirds of those listed by the National Law Enforcement Officers 
Memorial Fund may have been struck on purpose.79 For example in 2014, fifteen officers 
who died in the line of duty were struck by a vehicle. Ten of those officer deaths were 
classified as “vehicle assaults,” meaning they were struck on purpose. 
All of this should tell law enforcement administrators and other interested parties 
that we need more and better safety systems that are driven by accurate data. By following 
the accepted principles established by OSHA, the law enforcement administrator will find 
that this is a manageable process. 
C. PREVENTING GUNSHOT DEATHS BY FOLLOWING OSHA’S 
SYSTEMATIC PROCESS 
Since the data identified being shot as a significant hazard for police officers, 
OSHA requires that the hazard should be “prevented, corrected or controlled.”80 It is here 
that we can also expand our thinking. As mentioned earlier, law enforcement is not a 
mathematical or scientific endeavor. Science does apply to ballistics, however. In the 
simplest terms, a bullet that has been fired is a projectile that has velocity and mass. Rifle 
ammunition normally has more velocity than handgun ammunition and will require more 
consideration in our mitigation strategy. As part of our analysis we should also consider 
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other projectiles such as rocks, bottles, and falling objects. These generally would have less 
velocity than a fired bullet, but they have more mass and, just as a bullet, can injure or even 
kill. 
OSHA has identified eight systems to be considered during hazard mitigation. They 
are: engineering controls, safe work practices, administrative controls, personal protective 
equipment, systems to track hazard correction, preventative maintenance, emergency 
preparation, and medical programs.81 The next section examines how each of these 
mitigation systems can be applied to law enforcement safety.  
1. Engineering Controls 
OSHA describes engineering controls as, “the first and best strategy to control the 
hazard at its source.”82 OSHA goes on to say that “to the extent feasible, the environment 
and the job itself should be designed to eliminate hazards or reduce exposure to hazards.”83 
The nature of law enforcement gives police administrators few options here. A lot can be 
done to foster police community relationships, but the individual who chooses to shoot or 
throw an object at the police will not necessarily be mitigated by such strategies.  
One option that is available is to create a barrier between the attacker and the 
officer.84 In high-risk situations, that barrier is often an armored vehicle. The intent of 
having an armored vehicle is to protect the occupants from the same hazards just described 
. Most agencies emphasize the armored vehicle’s primary role is  to rescue officers and 
civilians from an insecure and hostile environment. The vehicle is also used by special 
weapons and tactics (SWAT) officers during operations to safely get eyes on a location 
and safely communicate with individuals inside of a structure. The vehicle is often used in 
a standby capacity during events or high-risk incidents that may require a tactical rescue or 
intervention.  
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Perhaps the most popular armored vehicle on the market today is the Lenco 
BearCat, shown in Figure 3. To look at the vehicle, it is not much different than an armored 
car that carries money on the streets of America every day. Of course, it is not the 
appearance of the vehicle that causes police departments to spend $200,000 to $400,000; . 
it is the safety afforded to the occupants by the armor plating. Every police department in 
a major city has many stories of using, or wishing they had available, an armored vehicle 
to rescue an officer or civilian from harm during a deadly incident. Perhaps the most 
famous example of this is the 1997 North Hollywood bank robbery incident where six 
civilians and ten officers were wounded by two bank robbers with automatic rifles and 
body armor.85 Having no armored vehicle available at the scene, officers commandeered 
bank armored cars, shown in Figure 4, to rescue wounded officers and civilians. Many of 
the wounded officers and citizens were clinging to life and needed immediate medical care. 
 
Figure 3.  Lenco BearCat86 
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Figure 4.  Armored Truck Used by LAPD during North Hollywood Shootout87 
Even though an armored vehicle is not the traditional shielding envisioned when 
considering OSHA guidelines, it is one that police administrators must consider. It is 
perhaps the only technology available to shield officers from flying projectiles, such as 
bullets, when addressing engineering controls. Lt. Dan Marcou, writing for 
PoliceOne.com, identified thirteen instances in which armored vehicles have saved police 
officer and civilian lives from 2006 to 2014.88 Such vehicles remain controversial, but the 
analysis clearly shows they may be required to meet mitigation standards. Agencies would 
have to perform their own analyses and determine to what extent an armored vehicle should 
be used or even if one needs to be available. 
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2. Safe Work Practices 
OSHA describes safe work practices as the “general workplace rules and operation 
specific rules.”89 It is in this area that law enforcement invests most of its energy to keep 
officers safe. Written policies and procedures are extensive in many agencies and may be 
so numerous they cannot easily be remembered. In addition to the written rules, law 
enforcement training emphasizes best practices that are developed by experienced officers 
and trainers. It is important for law enforcement to document the expectations of safe 
conduct by their officers and correct unsafe behavior early and modify training and policy 
when necessary. 
In addition to traditional police safe work practices, some OSHA-specific 
guidelines may also be required. The Kentucky Department of Criminal Justice has posted 
on its website the OSHA for Law Enforcement Summary.90 It outlines thirty-one specific 
OSHA and Kentucky regulations that apply to law enforcement.91 
Another example of the safe work practices system can be found in the required use 
of the Incident Command System (ICS). Most law enforcement agencies follow the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) direction on using the ICS during large or 
hazardous events and incidents. OSHA has included guidance in the use of the ICS on its 
website including the expectations of the Safety Officer. Among other duties, the Safety 
Officer will “develop and recommend measures for assuring personal safety, and to 
monitor and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe conditions.”92 ICS Form 215A requires 
that the Safety Officer identify known hazards and articulate mitigation strategies.93 If a 
hazard cannot be sufficiently mitigated, the operational plan may have to change. 
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3. Administrative Controls 
OSHA describes administrative controls as measures that “include additional relief 
workers, exercise breaks and the rotation of workers.”94 This is an area where many law 
enforcement agencies could improve. With the 2008 economic downturn, many law 
enforcement agencies slowed or stopped hiring new officers. The economy seems to be 
improving and agencies are hiring again, but the effects of the downturn will be long lasting 
and take years to recover. In 2011, it was estimated that 12,000 officers had lost their jobs 
and 30,000 positions in county and municipal departments would go unfilled.95 To adjust, 
many agencies pay overtime, causing officers to have less time to decompress and spend 
with their families. Additionally, many officers work part time to supplement their income. 
As a result, officers experience fatigue and burnout, which can lead to safety issues for the 
officer and the agency. According to the National Institute of Justice, stress and fatigue for 
law enforcement officers can be amplified by any combination of the following: 
Work-related factors:  
• Poor management 
• Inadequate or broken equipment 
• Excessive overtime 
• Frequent rotating shifts 
• Regular changes in duties—for example, spending one day filling out 
paperwork and the next intervening in a violent domestic dispute. 
Individual factors: 
• Family problems 
• Financial problems 
• Health problems 
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• Taking second jobs to make extra income96 
It is incumbent on the law enforcement administrator to recognize these factors 
during the job hazard analysis and develop strategies to mitigate them. Failing to do so can 
lead to what the National Institute of Justice report calls chronic fatigue syndrome.97 The 
report states: 
Law enforcement officers commonly work extended hours in ever-changing 
environments that can cause great mental and physical stress. Enduring 
fatigue for a long period of time may lead to chronic fatigue syndrome, a 
health problem characterized by extreme fatigue that does not improve with 
bed rest and continues to worsen with physical and mental activity. 
Fatigue can: 
• Impair an officer’s mental and physical ability. 
• Create a cycle of fatigue.  
• Limit job performance. 
• Damage an officer’s health.98 
Returning to our example of preventing officer deaths from gunshots, it is clear that 
more must be included in our hazard mitigation plan than policy and equipment. An officer 
suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome may fail to recognize a dangerous situation that 
could result in them being shot. Additionally, once an officer is fired upon, their response 
may be slow or ineffective to survive the encounter. 
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4. PPE Hazard Assessment and Training 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) is a new term for law enforcement. It normally 
causes one to think of a Level C hazardous materials suit.99 This type of PPE is used by 
law enforcement to prevent exposure to bodily fluids and other contaminates. In the post-
9-11 era, these suits and respirators have been upgraded to protect against a wide range of 
chemical, biological, and radioactive hazards.  
The use of PPE must expand beyond this traditional thinking to keep officers safe. 
The Kentucky guidance to law enforcement cited earlier includes this illuminating section: 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (29 CFR §1910 Subpart I) / 
Bloodborne Pathogens (29 CRF §1910.1030)  
This standard covers the need for the employer to assess the need for PPE 
for employees, based upon the types of risk the employee might face during 
their workday and to provide it. In a law enforcement context, within a 
station, officers might be subject to blood and other body substances as the 
result of an injury, for example and need gloves and appropriate cleaning 
supplies. Another form of PPE that some agencies may be called upon to 
provide is a personal flotation device (PFD), should an officer be required 
to work in the vicinity of a waterway. OSHA has not, at this point, ruled 
upon the issue of bullet-resistant vests. This standard also discusses the 
process to be following in case of a known or possible exposure to 
bloodborne pathogens.100 
It is time that police administrators and state and federal OSHA authorities begin 
to look at police hazards and PPE as they do every other hazardous profession. Diane Stein, 
the Safety and Health Coordinator for City Employee Union Local 237 (New York), asked 
OSHA if the “Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) standard, specifically 29 CF 191 
0.132(a) apply to body armor (such as, but not limited to, bullet or stab resistant vests)?”101 
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The question was answered by Thomas Galassi of the OSHA Directorate of Enforcement 
Programs: 
If an employer chooses bullet proof vests and body armor to protect its 
employees on the job from gunshot wounds and knife stab wounds, the 
employer must select equipment that is adequate to protect against these 
hazards and must provide it at no cost to its employee. OSHA considers 
equipment or clothing such as body armor, a bullet proof vest or a stab-
resistant vest, to be personal protective equipment that may be required by 
1910.132(a)1 and would not be ordinary clothing or everyday clothing for 
purposes of the exceptions for payment at 1910.132(h)(4)(ii)2 or (iii)3. 
It is important to note that Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 encourages states to develop and operate their own 
safety and health programs that may have different standards from OSHA’s 
standards, but are determined to be at least as effective. Currently there are 
22 states and U.S. territories that operate State Plans which cover both the 
private sector and state and local government employees, and five State 
Plans which cover public employees only.102 
The first line of the response contributes to why law enforcement struggles in the 
area of safety and particularly with PPE. It states that agencies have a choice as to issuing 
bullet resistant vests to its officers and that if they do, the agency must pay for them. Given 
the data, it seems clear that bullets are a real hazard to police officers and it seems that the 
law would require a mitigation strategy be implemented. Perhaps what is missing is the 
Job Hazard Analysis described earlier. Once the agency determines that their officers are 
at risks from bullets and other projectiles, would they then be required to25 provide the 
proper PPE? It is worth repeating that OSHA law directs employers, “If any hazards exist 
that pose an immediate danger to an employee’s life or health, take immediate action 
to protect the worker.”103 
Another key point made by Galassi is that “Section 18 of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 encourages states to develop and operate their own safety and 
health programs that may have different standards from OSHA’s standards, but are 
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determined to be at least as effective.”104 It appears we may be in a cycle where federal 
OSHA will not create specific law enforcement standards because most police officers 
work for local jurisdictions and are not covered by federal OSHA law. This does not 
explain why they fail to establish specific standards for federal law enforcement agencies 
like the U.S. Marshalls and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whom they do have 
a duty to protect. Such regulations would immediately transfer to states like Indiana by 
virtue of Indiana following all federal guidelines. Federal OSHA encourages the states to 
fill the void but none have accepted this challenge. IOSHA describes emergency 
responders as follows:  
People’s lives often depend on the quick reaction and competent care of 
police officers, firefighters, medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics. 
Individuals that work in these occupations work to maintain order, enforce 
laws and protect lives in some of the most dangerous situations. Because 
the work of emergency responders is inherently dangerous, managing their 
safety can be more accurately described as managing their level of risk.105 
Indiana supports this notion even further by, when addressing traffic vests, it correctly 
asserts that: 
In order to avoid a citation for a public safety official directing traffic who 
is without reflective gear, the employer must be able to demonstrate that a 
hazard assessment was performed and that, based upon that analysis, no 
protective clothing is required. A hazard assessment does not necessarily 
have to be site or incident specific and could be part of a department’s 
Standard Operating Procedure.106 
The question is: why is the same logic not applied to the ballistic vest and 
helmet?107 The data clearly indicate we could save more officers lives by enforcing 
Indiana’s guidance on all types of hazards and PPE, particularly those concerning officers 
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being shot. It appears that federal OSHA cannot act locally and will not act federally. The 
states will not act even though they seem to be expected to by federal OSHA. 
So, what is a ballistic vest and the science that makes it the best choice for PPE 
against bullets and other projectiles? Stephanie Kwolek, a DuPont chemist, invented the 
technology behind Kevlar in the mid-1960s. Kevlar, and its modern cousins, are the 
material the makes a ballistic vest. Also known as soft body armor, these vests have saved 
over 3,000 police officers lives since 1972 by stopping bullets that normally would have 
killed them.108 Notice it is not a bullet-proof vest. When a bullet strikes the material, the 
kinetic energy is spread over the entire area of the vest. By doing so, hopefully, the bullet 
is trapped in one of the layers of material before striking the wearer. Even in the best-case 
scenario, the wearer is still absorbing an enormous amount of energy. Lacerations, 
contusions, muscle damage, bone fractures, and organ damage are all still possible as a 
result of the trauma.109 
By the late 1970s, soft body armor had become fairly commonplace for local law 
enforcement.110 Despite the increased safety offered by the vest, many in law enforcement 
chose not to wear it because it was hot and uncomfortable.111 Vest manufacturers have 
long known that they must find a balance between ballistic protection (safety) and 
wearability (comfort).112 Until 2011, most agencies allowed officers the option to wear the 
vest or not.113 This changed after the federal government altered its grant program to 
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purchase body armor and required departments participating in the program to have a 
policy requiring officer to wear them.114 
In the late 1980s, tactical vests became prevalent for law enforcement SWAT 
teams. The tactical vest is worn over the officer’s uniform and provides even more layers 
of ballistic material, which increases safety. The next technology jump came by adding 
ceramic plates to the tactical vest, increasing safety even more. Soft body armor is designed 
to stop most handgun ammunition, but the ceramic plate can stop some rifle ammunition. 
These added layers of Kevlar and the weight of the ceramic plates significantly reduce 
wearability, though. As a result, the tactical vest is only worn when a significant ballistic 
threat (someone may shoot you) is imminent or anticipated and normally only by SWAT 
team members. 
Now that this chapter has highlighted the need for officers to be issued a ballistic 
vest and be required to wear it as part of their identified PPE for hazard mitigation, there 
is still more to the analysis. From 1980 to 2010, 46 percent of officers who died from being 
shot were shot in the head.115 Another study looked at occupational homicides of 796 
officers killed from 1996 to 2010 and found that 92 percent (739) of them had been shot.116 
Of those who had been shot, 55 percent (439) were shot in the head or neck. Only 29 
percent (228) were shot in the upper torso. These data clearly indicate that our mitigation 
strategy must include some type of PPE for the officer’s head. The only technology 
available to law enforcement is the ballistic helmet.  
Like ballistic vests, the ballistic helmet is made of Kevlar that is hardened and 
shaped. Though it may not appear the same since it does not have the flexibility of soft 
body armor, the layers of Kevlar can be seen by cutting or breaking the outer shell to reveal 
the material. Like the vest, the helmet is not bullet proof. It absorbs kinetic energy just as 
the vest does and the wearer is subject to the same added injuries from an impact. The 
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helmet is not rated to stop rifle fire.117 However, there are documented cases of rifle rounds 
striking the helmet and being directed around the wearer. If a rifle bullet has stuck another 
material prior to striking the helmet, the bullet may have deformed and/or slowed enough 
that its remaining energy can be safely absorbed by the helmet. The primary role of the 
helmet is to protect the head against injury from a variety of threats, which include gunshot 
wounds and blunt force trauma.118 
The Kevlar helmet began entering police service in the mid-1990s through the 
Department of Defense 1033 program.119 Law enforcement viewed this new technology 
as an answer to address many hazards faced by its officers. Law enforcement identified 
three specific threats that this one piece of technology could address: high-velocity 
projectiles such as bullets and fragmentation; low-velocity projectiles such as rocks and 
bottles; and falling debris, which is common after a structural collapse.120 No other 
technology on the market today can mitigate all three of these hazards.  
So why do officers not wear the helmet all of the time? Just like the vest, it comes 
down to wearability. The helmet is heavy and cumbersome. Like the tactical vest, it is only 
worn when there is an immediate or anticipated threat. Many officers, even though it is 
available, will not wear the helmet because of perception. Like the early days of the vest, 
they do not want to be the first to put it on. To my knowledge, no agency has a policy 
requiring the use of the helmet like most do now for the vest. Again, it is a balance between 
safety and wearability.  
This is where the police administrator must step in. Not only should the helmet be 
purchased and provided to the officers, policy must be written to guide the officer on when 
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to wear it. By using our hazard analysis, we can identify some situations when the helmet 
would be a mandatory piece of the necessary PPE for an incident. There will also be times 
when a Safety Officer has identified a specific hazard during the course of an event or 
incident that requires the use of the helmet to mitigate the danger and protect the officer. 
Finally, the officer should be encouraged to wear the helmet when they recognize a 
potential hazard that could be mitigated by the helmet.  
5. Systems to Track Hazard Correction 
Documentation is the key to an effective safety and health management system. 
Hazards must be identified and recorded. Mitigation strategies must be implemented, 
recorded and tracked for effectiveness. Hazards that develop despite established mitigation 
strategies must also be documented and corrected. The research indicates that law 
enforcement does none of this. At the conclusion of the Police Executive Research Forum’s 
(PERF) report on Reducing Officer Injuries, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) noted that,  
overall findings showed that the majority of injuries were those that would 
not be collected by traditional collection mechanisms, such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 
program or the Uniform Crime Report data.  
They went on to say,  
it is the IACP’s position that no injury or death to a law enforcement officer 
is acceptable. Therefore, it is vitally important that all agencies instill a 
strong culture of safety. Tracking injuries is one important first step toward 
creating this culture of safety. Through injury tracking, agencies will be 
better informed as to what types of injuries are occurring and will be able 
to mitigate the risks for those injuries by targeting resources and instituting 
policies and procedures.121 
The Officer Safety and Wellness (OSW) Group was established by the DoJ in 2011 
to improve officer safety and wellness. Among its recommendations are: 
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• Ensure officers have the equipment needed to operate safely (e.g., gun 
lights, ballistic shields, vests, rescue vehicles, and thermal imaging). 
• Investigate gunfire deaths and injuries through an independent party, 
similar to the processes the fire service uses or those of the National 
Transportation Safety Board.  
• Increase research on all aspects of officer safety and wellness. 
• Enhance education and training. All of the groups focused particularly on 
the need to conduct threat assessments, more situational firearms training, 
mental preparedness, and use of technology. 
• Create a clearinghouse for data and information on officer deaths and 
injuries, and develop relationships with the medical community for 
research. 
• Clarify vest policies and explore types of vests. Some departments are 
looking into external vest carriers as an option.  
• Create a culture of safety in policing—one in which safety is a way of 
doing business and officers reinforce sound safety practices with peers.122 
The formation of the OSW Group and the IACP study are encouraging, but police 
administrators should not wait to improve safety in their own agencies. Much of what is 
being recommended is already available in OSHA guidance concerning hazard 
documentation, mitigation, and tracking. The national database will be an added asset but 
may be years in the making. 
6. Preventive Maintenance Systems 
This generally refers to maintenance on equipment and tracking issues that are 
identified. Law enforcement must ensure that all of its equipment is functioning in good 
working order. The timely replacement of PPE, to include the ballistic vest, should be a 
regular part of an agency’s safety system. 
Another, perhaps nontraditional, area to be considered is the maintenance of the 
officers themselves. The physical health, mental health, and general well-being of officers 
are critical to their safety and the safety of their fellow officers. Some agencies have 
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wellness programs and fitness programs to promote good health. Emotional well-being is 
also being discussed and supported to a greater extent than it had previously. The 
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) has established the Office of 
Professional Development and Police Wellness in an attempt to intervene when officers 
may be nearing a crisis. Captain Brian Nanavaty of IMPD identified five core areas where 
most officers fail, “as defined by three years of research and over 300 officer interventions 
by IMPD are addictive issues, behavioral health, physical health, personality issues and 
family-relationship.”123 The IMPD program uses self, peer, and supervisor referrals to 
identify officers and assigns mentors to support officers needing assistance. Performance 
documentation is emphasized along with early intervention to identify and assist officers 
before a crisis arises. 
7. Emergency Preparation 
In defining this area, OSHA states, “During emergencies, hazards appear that 
normally are not found in the workplace. These may be the result of natural causes (floods, 
tornadoes, etc.), events caused by humans but beyond control (train or plane accidents, 
terrorist activities, etc.) or within a firm’s own systems due to unforeseen circumstances or 
events.”124 Definitions such as these do little to assist law enforcement to improve safety 
since the basic function of a police officer is to respond to emergencies that, more often 
than not, are caused by humans. OSHA, academics, and police administrators need to work 
together to create definitions and regulations to assist law enforcement in improving safety.  
That said, one thing professional police agencies do well is plan for emergencies. 
With the acceptance of Incident Command, threat analysis and planning have improved 
considerably. Officers are encouraged to identify at-risk businesses, such as banks, and 
devise their own response plans. During major events, plans are made for weather 
emergencies, evacuations, and even suspicious devices or explosion responses. Two areas 
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suggested by OSHA that may be of concern for law enforcement are employee information 
and training as well as emergency drills or practical exercises. Even though law 
enforcement has improved its planning processes, the time devoted to training and 
exercises remains limited. 
In our specific example of an officer being shot, law enforcement needs to ensure 
that it is prepared to respond. This would certainly be an emergency that falls within the 
OSHA description at the beginning of this section. Every agency should have plans and 
conduct training on the various issues associated with an officer being shot. The OSW 
Group report “Officer Deaths and Injuries from Gunfire” makes these recommendations: 
The following are examples of policies that a department should not only 
currently have but also review for ongoing updates and have internally 
audited to ensure they are being implemented properly:  
• Incident command 
• Officer deaths (e.g., notifications, a family liaison, and funeral planning)  
• Critical incident stress debriefing  
• Safety equipment (e.g., vests and seatbelts)  
• Clear use of force and reporting directives  
• Communications (external and internal)  
• Memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with neighboring 
jurisdictions125 
The OSW Group also recommends that “policy development and updates should 
include a review of the research and understanding of best practices.”126 As mentioned 
earlier, however, the OSW Group has also noted that current research is seriously lacking. 
This should not discourage the police administrator from creating their own data and 
working with others to improve officer safety now and to make changes as more and better 
data becomes available. 
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8. Medical Programs 
OSHA expects a medical program to “deliver services that prevent hazards that can 
cause illness and injury, recognize and treat illness and injury, and limit the severity of 
work-related injury and illness.”127 IMPD’s Office of Professional Development and 
Officer Wellness Program would certainly fall in this category. Hopefully, more law 
enforcement agencies will see the benefit of such a program and establish it for their own 
officers. Many agencies also have programs that provide annual physicals, reduced-cost 
health clinics, and fitness programs to assist officers in preventing injury and illness. 
Officers also count on immediate and qualified medical care with they are injured 
in the line of duty. Most large agencies that work in urban areas have an excellent 
relationship with fire and emergency medical services (EMS) medical responders. Some 
agencies, such as IMPD, have begun to issue gunshot kits to all of their officers. The kits 
are paid for with private donations from the community and did not impact the agency’s 
budget or  compete against other safety equipment.128 The kit generally includes a 
tourniquet, scissors, a compression bandage, and a pair of non-latex gloves. The military 
actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us that surviving a gunshot wound may be 
determined by if, or how well, first responders are able to stop the bleeding. Recent studies 
have shown that 
exsanguination from extremity wounds was the leading cause of death 
among American casualties in Vietnam and accounted for 7.8 percent of 
preventable deaths in the first five years of the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.129 
The gunshot kit is compact and designed specifically to stop bleeding. IMPD 
requires just a few hours of training, which is received at the time the kit is issued. An 
added benefit is the fact that the kits have been used most often by officers trying to save 
the life of a citizen who has been hit by gunfire. In an emergency, an officer left alone, 
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such as those pinned down in the North Hollywood shootout, may be able to treat 
themselves until help arrives. 
This example is geared toward surviving the identified hazard of being shot. The 
different steps of categories should be applied to all identified hazards faced by law 
enforcement officers so they can be properly mitigated. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Any systematic process requires steps or established protocols to be followed. A 
systematic approach to safety begins this process by implementing the OSHA concepts of 
the job hazard analysis, hazard identification, and hazard mitigation. As demonstrated in 
this chapter, these concepts and the resulting systematic processes are adaptable to law 
enforcement. The example of identifying being shot as the most significant hazard in law 
enforcement demonstrates the use of the job hazard analysis and hazard identification. The 
use of body armor, trauma kits, armored vehicles, and ballistic helmets are examples of 
hazard mitigation strategies.  
To achieve this systematic process will require law enforcement to improve how 
deaths and injuries are currently documented and reported. Once hazards have been 
identified and mitigated, ongoing monitoring must inform administrators of the success or 
need for improvement in mitigating the identified hazard.  
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IV. JAMES REASON: PREVIOUS SUCCESSES AND 
APPLICATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
This chapter explores the work of Dr. James Reason with a focus on the airline 
industry and the medical profession. Reason’s safety culture theory is discussed as well  
how each of the four components can be applied to law enforcement. The airline industry 
is be reviewed with an emphasis on its use of a near-miss reporting system and how other 
professions have adapted it to their use. Additionally, the airline industry’s use of Reason’s 
human error model is analyzed and outlines how law enforcement would benefit by 
adopting the system model of review. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
medical profession and its use of Reason’s approach to safety. The Incident Decision Tree 
is discussed in detail. 
A. JAMES REASON 
Dr. James Reason is a professor at the University of Manchester. He has done 
extensive work in identifying organization processes and human error.130 These concepts 
are applied to the promotion of safety in many industries, including the airline and medical 
fields. Dr. Reason has published several books and articles related to safety. Additionally, 
his principles and conclusions have formed the basis for safety policy, documentation, 
training, and promotion throughout multiple fields. Dr. Rob Lee of the Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation in Australia described Dr. Reason as 
Fundamental to the Bureau and the international aviation community’s 
contemporary safety philosophy is the work of Professor James Reason, of 
the University of Manchester, UK, and his colleagues. Reason and his team 
have developed a conceptual and theoretical approach to the safety of large, 
complex socio-technical systems, of which aviation is an excellent example. 
As part of the development of his model Reason analyzed major accidents 
in aviation, shipping, rail, nuclear power, aerospace and so on. These case 
studies represented catastrophic failures of such systems.131 
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Dr. Reason has divided his safety culture theory into four main elements: the 
Reporting Culture, the Just Culture, the Flexible Culture, and the Learning Culture.132 Dr. 
Reason states that, “Together they interact to create an informed culture which, for our 
purposes, equates with the term ‘safety culture.’”133 This thesis argues that this is the basis 
of a systematic approach to safety that law enforcement can employ as a next step to 
applying OSHA standards. 
This chapter explores each element of Dr. Reason’s safety culture and its usefulness 
for law enforcement. The chapter continues by exploring the airline industry and its 
adoption of the Reason model to promote safety. The human error model is discussed and 
shown to be useful to law enforcement. A review of the medical industry follows, as this 
industry has also adopted the Reason model to reduce errors and promote safety. The 
Incident Decision Tree is specifically highlighted to demonstrate how to review errors once 
they have been committed. The conclusion takes all this information and makes the case 
that law enforcement can apply many of these theories and tools to its benefit.  
B. COMPONENTS OF A SAFETY CULTURE 
1. Reporting Culture 
Dr. Reason found that to promote a reporting culture, an organization must listen 
to people most familiar with the dangers of the job. He wrote, “To achieve this, it is 
necessary to engineer a reporting culture—an organizational climate in which people are 
prepared to report their errors and near misses.”134 This would seem to be a stretch for a 
law enforcement agency. By reporting errors and near misses, an agency may open itself 
up to civil liability. Additional, officers may be punished if they self-report an error that 
had previously been unnoticed. There is no question that organizations that have 
successfully established a reporting culture had the same concerns. And yet, organizations 
exist who have done so. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority of the Australian Government 
                                                 
132 Reason, Managing Risks, 195. 
133 Reason, 196. 
134 Reason, 195. 
51 
includes as a key component of a safety system; the objective of “creating a non-punitive 
work environment which encourages hazard and error reporting.”135 
This concept is gaining some attention in law enforcement circles. 
Recommendation 6.7 in the 21st Century Policing study asked that Congress “enact 
legislation similar to the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986 that would support 
the development of an effective peer review error management system for law enforcement 
similar to what exists for medicine.”136 Such a program would encourage the reporting of 
errors and near misses while protecting officers and agencies by preventing the information 
from legal discovery.137 This legislation would be helpful, but agencies should not wait 
for its implementation to begin their own safety reporting. 
2. Just Culture 
Law enforcement is a rule-based profession. Agencies are created by laws. They 
enforce ordinances and laws. Officers are held accountable by laws, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, general orders, and standard operating procedures, to name a few. When an 
error occurs, officers who are found accountable can be given a written reprimand, 
suspended without pay, demoted, terminated, and in some cases charged criminally or 
civilly. On its surface, this would not be a good place to implement Dr. Reason’s “just 
culture.” He says what is needed is “an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, 
even rewarded, for providing essential safety-related information—but in which they are 
also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior.”138 
This atmosphere of trust is not easily found in law enforcement organizations due 
to their reliance on rules and their sole remediation being to punish. The Police Foundation 
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is attempting to get around this and create a resource for officers to report near misses 
without fear of punishment. The Police Foundation defines a near miss as “a close call and/
or unsafe occurrence or condition that could have resulted in a serious injury or fatality if 
not for a fortunate break in the chain of events.”139 The Police Foundation has established 
an on-line reporting system that does not require attribution.140 In applying the lessons of 
Dr. Reason, the Police Foundation is using near-miss reporting to improve safety. They 
acknowledge that near-miss reporting has proven successful in other high-risk industries 
like aviation, military operations, healthcare, and fire and EMS services.141 As suggested 
by Dr. Reason’s safety culture and this thesis’s recommendation of a systematic approach, 
the Police Foundation uses the near-miss reporting to “improve training, equipment, 
policies, procedures, and tactics in order to reduce risk, improve officer safety, and save 
lives.”142 By acknowledging that error reporting and investigating should focus on 
improving safety and not punishment, the Police Foundation is doing what others have 
successfully accomplished. No one argues that punishment is not warranted in some 
situations; however, it should not be the primary focus. All of the gains suggested by the 
near-miss reporting rest entirely with an organization. An officer alone cannot change 
policy, for example, but can be punished for a violation. This is the challenge that exists to 
create a just culture in law enforcement today.  
When the GAIN Working Group E set out to improve aviation safety by publishing 
the “Roadmap to a Just Culture,” they understood that they needed an organizational shift. 
They said that to achieve a constructive just culture, an organization had to move away 
from a traditional blame culture.143 They went on to say that two concepts must exist in a 
just culture: 
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1. Human error is inevitable and the system needs to be continually 
monitored and improved to accommodate those errors 
2. Individuals are accountable for their actions if they knowingly violate 
safety procedures or policies.144 
Law enforcement’s traditional view of human error is not that it is inevitable. In 
fact, law enforcement and others who follow the traditional line of thinking believe that a 
human makes a conscience choice to error. Not a single police manual researched 
mentioned allowing for human error as part of a larger system that needs to be maintained 
and improved. Blame and punishment are the common and most expedient responses to 
human error. 
Dr. Reason argues that there are two approaches organizations can take when 
addressing human error: the Person Model and the System Model. He defines each as: 
• The person approach focuses on the errors of individuals: forgetfulness, 
inattention, or moral weakness 
• The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which people 
work and tries to build defenses to avert errors or mitigate their effects.145 
Like previous organizations or professions that have transformed the way they 
manage safety, law enforcement too shall change. To have a just culture, employees on the 
line must trust management to care for their well-being and create an environment where 
risks are managed. The person approach does neither of these things.  
Working from Dr. Reason’s research, Ron Hanks and Joe Bates presented a concise 
tool for outlining the differences between the Person Model and the System Model, shown 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Comparing the Person Model and the System Model of 
Human Error146 
Person Model System Model 
Name 
Remedial attention focused on the 
task and the workplace Blame 
Shame Organization 
Retrain Supervision 
Write another procedure Managing the manageable 
Fire the perpetrator  
We Ask Who? We Ask Why? 
 
It is important to reassert that nothing in the system model absolves employees of 
their behavior. In the following sections, a detailed discussion of human error explains the 
complexity of evaluating a person’s actions. A plan to manage that process is shared as 
well.  
3. Flexible Culture 
Of the necessary cultures described by Dr. Reason as necessary to achieve a safety 
culture, the flexible culture is most suited to law enforcement. He defines it as “shifting 
from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter professional structure, where control 
passes to task experts on the spot, and then reverts back to the traditional bureaucratic mode 
once the emergency has passed.”147 Law enforcement is highly bureaucratic and 
hierarchical. Most tasks are administrative in nature and questions can be answered by 
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consulting a myriad of policies, procedures, and general orders. Decisions can be passed 
up the chain of command where it will take weeks, months, or eternity to receive an answer. 
Occasionally, there is an incident that poses a severe risk to life and safety. A SWAT 
incident, a riot, an active shooter and a perimeter with suspects inside are all examples of 
occasions where law enforcement adeptly shifts from the bureaucratic mode to the task 
experts on the scene. Occasionally, there are examples of where this transition failed to 
take place with disastrous results. 
One example is the Los Angeles Police Department response to May Day in 2007. 
During this event, a group of protesters interrupted a large group of people who had 
peacefully gathered in a park. The protesters began to behave in a threatening manner and 
became intermixed with the peaceful group in the park. Officers used crowd control tactics, 
including less-lethal munitions, to disperse everyone in the park. At a critical point in the 
incident, upper command chose to insert itself in the decision-making process in place of 
task experts who were predesignated as incident commanders and operational 
personnel.148 This occurrence is not significant because it occurred. Such incidents are 
common in law enforcement though not desirable. What is unique is that LAPD 
documented their challenges, lessons learned and a remediation plan for the rest of us to 
learn from. Such after action reporting is not common despite its many advantages.  
The hierarchical structure is very centralized. Relying on task experts on the line is 
decentralized. To achieve a flexible culture, organizations need both. It is culture that 
makes the difference in an emergency over policy and procedure. Karl Weick explains 
culture as creating a 
homogeneous set of assumptions and decision premises which, when they 
are invoked on a local and decentralized basis, preserve coordination and 
centralization. Most important, when centralization occurs via decision 
premises and assumptions, compliance occurs without surveillance. This is 
in sharp contrast to centralization by rules and regulations or centralization 
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by standardization and hierarchy, both of which require high 
surveillance.149 
It is a given that law enforcement operates in both the centralized and decentralized 
structure. How the profession responds to errors and shares lessons learned is what can be 
improved by changing the culture. Darrel Stephens, director of the Major Cities Chiefs 
Association, notes that how we respond can impact our relationship with those we serve. 
He states, “Police officers are human beings engaged in sorting out complex and 
emotionally charged situations—they are bound to make mistakes. It is how the department 
responds to them that will determine whether or not trust will be won or lost.”150 
4. Learning Culture 
Despite all of the training required for law enforcement officers to maintain their 
certifications, the profession and individual agencies have difficulty learning. If they do 
learn, they often fail to implement the recommended remediation no matter how obvious 
it may be.  
Despite giving us this element of the safety culture, Dr. Reason does little to explain 
it. He does note that the elements of the learning culture are easy to identify: observing, 
reflecting, creating, and acting.151 It is the acting, or required remediation, that 
organizations find challenging. This can be due to budget cycles, financial shortages, lack 
of consensus on solutions, election cycles, and management changes to list a few. What 
challenges law enforcement more than other organizations is that it does not readily collect 
safety information. Since most to not conform to OSHA standards in any way, and we have 
previously discussed the absence of documentation, law enforcement is not even observing 
in a meaningful way, let alone acting. The near-miss reporting mentioned earlier exists 
because of this shortfall.  
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5. An Informed Culture Is a Safety Culture 
Now that we have reviewed the components of an informed culture, have we 
achieved a safety culture? Dr. Reason asserts that the safety culture is more than the sum 
of its parts.152 Law enforcement agencies document numerous incidents, including when 
officers are injured. Peers and supervisors informally discuss tactics and which are safer 
than others. Trainers constantly invoke officer safety as a reason for their instruction and 
methods. Does all of this equal an informed culture and a safety culture? The research 
would indicate not nearly so. Simply doing things like writing reports and attending 
training does not create the culture necessary. Policy and procedures do not create a 
systematic approach that is necessary to be informed and make intelligent changes to 
promote safety. 
The attitude of U.S. law enforcement in regard to safety is not unique. Other 
countries have expressed the same desire to improve safety and mitigate risks. Even 
Australia, which averages one officer murder per year, is applying new strategies.153 The 
Australian Institute of Criminology asserts that risks will only be reduced by identifying 
risk factors and establishing effective mitigation strategies.154 All of the research is 
pointing law enforcement in the same direction. As Dr. Reason said, what we lack is action. 
C. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND DR. REASON 
1. History of U.S. Airline Safety 
The issue of safety has always been a part of aircraft and airline development. One 
of the original uses for aircraft was to deliver the U.S. mail. As a result, the federal 
government had an interest to ensure the aircraft arrived safely at the destination. In 1926, 
Congress passed the Air Commerce Act, which established the Aeronautics Branch in the 
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Department of Commerce.155 The Aeronautics Branch was responsible for “licensing and 
ensuring the airworthiness of all aircraft engaged in interstate commerce, certifying airmen 
similarly engaged, and developing and enforcing air traffic rules.”156 Beginning in 1930, 
this was accomplished by certifying pilots, mechanics, and air field workers.157 The Civil 
Aeronautics Act was passed in 1938 and created the Air Safety Board to investigate 
accidents.158 In the years following, the status of airline safety made gains and at times 
suffered setbacks. They faced budget shortfalls common in government organizations, 
which caused safety to deteriorate at times.  
In 1959, the Federal Aviation Agency was established and took over “safety 
rulemaking activities.”159 Standards and inspections continued to improve over the years 
and flight safety progressed as well. In 1966, Congress passed legislation creating the 
Department of Transportation, which absorbed the FAA, now known as the Federal 
Aviation Administration.160 A continued focus on safety created the systems approach in 
use today.  
System safety approaches to regulation include the allocation of resources 
on the basis of risk, the need for air carriers to operate their own safety 
management systems that identify and mitigate hazards and risks, and the 
promotion of a safety culture in which each member of the organization 
strives for quality and safety.161 
In various forms, the airline industry has maintained an organized approach to 
safety for nearly 100 years. The current philosophy is focused on safety systems. No system 
will be effective, however, unless there is a real culture in the organization to promote and 
maintain safety. That culture will not exist without a strong emphasis by senior 
                                                 
155 Mark Hansen, Carolyn McAndrews, and Emily Berkeley, The Advent of Aviation Safety 
Oversight, DOT/FAA/AR-08/39 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, July 2008), 2, 
http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar0839.pdf. 
156 Hansen, McAndrews, and Berkeley, 2. 
157 Hansen, McAndrews, and Berkeley, 4. 
158 Hansen, McAndrews, and Berkeley, 5. 
159 Hansen, McAndrews, and Berkeley, 13. 
160 Hansen, McAndrews, and Berkeley, 19. 
161 Hansen, McAndrews, and Berkeley, 27. 
59 
management to create a safety management system.162 A first step by senior management 
should be to create a safety policy. Such policies are rare or nonexistent in law enforcement. 
According to the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority, a good place to start would 
be a policy that includes: 
• The overall safety objectives of the organization 
• The commitment of senior management to provide the resources necessary 
for effective safety management 
• A statement about responsibility and accountability for safety at all levels 
of the organization 
• Management’s explicit support of a “positive safety culture,” as part of the 
overall safety culture of the organization.163 
Most law enforcement agencies today would not be comfortable creating such a 
policy statement. As identified earlier, law enforcement is more comfortable blaming 
individuals instead of fixing organizational conditions that create unsafe practices and 
conditions. This is consistent with the airline industry, among others, that have evolved 
into organizations and professions that have advanced safety cultures that can be emulated 
by law enforcement.  
2. Human Factors and Human Error 
The term “human factors” is a recognition of the role humans play in safety 
systems. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia devotes an entire section of 
training to human factors. It states, “Human factors refers to the wide range of issues that 
affect how people perform tasks in the work and non-work environments.”164 FAA 
training in human factors includes topics such as human error, environmental 
considerations, planning, communication, and teamwork.165 The role of the human in any 
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complex system must be understood when working to identify hazards, mitigate identified 
hazards, and improve overall safety. Though part of human factors, human error stands 
out. Understanding what causes human error in a particular system is critical to improving 
safety. With that acknowledgement, however, it is wrong to simply assume the human is 
the problem.  
a. Active Failures and Latent Conditions 
When trying to improve law enforcement safety, the human involvement in the 
equation is most apparent. In most cases, injuries and deaths are caused by the actions of 
the officer, as in a one-car crash, or the actions of another human. Perhaps this is why law 
enforcement is quick to blame officers for errors, write new policies, retrain, and then move 
on. This does not meet the requirements of an effective safety system. Reasons states that 
humans contribute to errors in two ways.  
Most obviously, it is by errors and violations committed at the “sharp end” 
of the system—by pilots, air traffic controllers, police officers, insurance 
brokers, financial traders, ships’ crews, control room operators, 
maintenance personnel and the like. Such unsafe acts are likely to have a 
direct impact on the safety of the system and, because of the immediacy of 
their adverse effects, these acts are termed active failures.166 
An officer involved in a one-car crash during a rainstorm while trying to get to an 
in-progress felony crime will soon have investigators asking if he/she was driving too fast 
for conditions. Any indication of an accelerated speed would end the investigation. The 
officer may face discipline and the matter will be forgotten. The challenge is that such 
crashes occur regularly in perfect weather and when not responding to serious calls for 
assistance while operating at a normal rate of speed. A recent review of law enforcement 
deaths found that “a large number of the crashes investigated were not related to either a 
call for service or a case of self-initiated activity.”167 Those like Reason, who promote 
safety systems, ask the question: If you hire good people who can competently perform the 
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tasks required, why do they keep failing in the same manner? Most police officers receive 
numerous hours of driving instruction during their initial training phase followed by 
observed driving proficiency during actual patrol conditions during Field Training. Those 
unable to perform to expected standards are retrained and terminated if necessary. Under 
such scrutiny, it is inconceivable that accidents considered preventable by the officer are 
so common. Beyond the human involved, something else is involved in the error or 
accident. 
Reason looks to latent conditions to explain those things beyond the immediate 
actions of those at the sharp end exposed to active failures. Reason’s concept of latent 
conditions is explained by Lee as 
decisions or actions, the damaging consequences of which may lie dormant 
for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with local 
triggering factors (such as, active failures, technical faults, atypical 
environmental conditions, and so on) to breach the system’s defenses. Their 
defining feature is that they were present within the system well before the 
onset of a recognizable accident sequence. They are most likely to be 
generated by people whose activities are removed in both time and space 
from the direct human-machine interface: designers, high-level 
decisionmakers, regulators, line managers.168 
To continue our example in a one-car crash, it is appropriate to look at speed, 
weather conditions, and other traditional factors. To look for latent conditions, however, 
we also need to assess distractions that have more recently entered the patrol vehicle. In-
car computers, cell phones, tactical radios, license plate readers and video/audio recorders 
are just a few things that may not be accounted for in training or follow-on investigations. 
Current discussions on distracted driving normally involve teens and cell phones, and 
rightfully so. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
3477 people were killed and 391,000 were injured in 2015 due to distracted driving.169 
How many more distractions are there for the police officer? To look for latent conditions, 
the investigator should determine if training is accounting for distracted driving. 
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Additionally, they should determine if current policies promote safety by clearly saying 
that distractions should be eliminated to the extent possible. Perhaps technology could 
assist by putting the computer screen in blackout mode if the vehicle is in motion. This is 
the extent, and more, that law enforcement should endeavor to standardize a systematic 
process to improve officer safety. It will require a progression away from the person model 
of discipline and a significant move to the system model of review.  
b. Human Factors in Law Enforcement 
Given the nature of law enforcement, nearly every work activity includes a majority 
of human factors. Rarely, though, are concerns identified in the airline industry specifically 
considered in law enforcement safety. An officer’s environment is often measured by 
community relations instead of an honest assessment of the hazards found in a particular 
work environment. The effectiveness of the officer’s team or overall teamwork is a 
measure of productivity instead of considered part of the safety system that can be reviewed 
and improved. A review of communications may be limited to radio, data, and reporting 
systems. Just as in the airline industry, agencies should consider how well policy is 
updated, distributed, and understood. As an example, when policy violations occur, such 
incidents should include a review of the effectiveness of the communication system. If law 
enforcement would adopt an understanding of human factors and conduct appropriate 
training, the profession would take a significant step toward implementing a safety system. 
c. Human Error in Law Enforcement 
To find what most think is human error in law enforcement, one would not need to 
look past the nightly news, recent DoJ investigations into whole agencies, or the 
prosecution and termination of officers who are thought to have erred. None of these 
reviews, however, considers the safety of the officers. Even though many of these inquiries 
attempt to establish best practices, the effort is in vain if it does not also improve the safety 
of the officers and the profession as a whole. The recently published report from the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing does identify as its sixth of six pillars, 
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“officer wellness and safety.”170 It does include the expansion of data collection and 
issuing gunshot kits already included in this thesis. What the report, and other such reports, 
fails to do is establish a system of safety commonly found in other professions and 
industries. Most of these systems are required by law and supported by all levels of the 
organization. Any study of human error in law enforcement must include the same system 
review commonly found outside of law enforcement. 
Like other professions, law enforcement should acknowledge that human errors do 
occur and set about trying to create and improve a safety system, including 
countermeasures, to reduce them when possible. Reasons states, “countermeasures are 
based on the assumption that although we cannot change the human condition, we can 
change the conditions under which humans work. A central idea is that of system 
defenses.”171 
Reason describes these barriers as slices of Swiss cheese acting as safety barriers 
to consequences of unsafe acts or conditions. The barriers, or slices of cheese, have holes 
or flaws in each layer of protection. Collectively, however, they prevent most serious 
outcomes to safety violations. This model acknowledges that errors exist. These errors 
include human errors. It goes on to suggest errors in training, policy, supervision, 
environment, and many others. This layered defensive model, illustrated in Figure 5, is 
what gives rise to the safety system. 
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Figure 5.  James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of Error Defenses172 
3. NASA and FAA Anonymous Safety Reporting Systems 
In the current climate of DoJ investigations and criminal prosecutions of police 
officers, it is necessary now, more than ever, to continue to pursue improved officer safety. 
As noted in the Swiss cheese model, most safety violations do not result in major 
consequences for the officer or the agency. These are termed “near misses” by many in the 
safety field. Personnel involved in a near miss may be reluctant to share their experience 
for fear of litigation, discipline, or peer scorn. By sharing this information, deficiencies in 
the safety system, or holes in the Swiss cheese, could be identified and corrected. The 
airline industry found that “safety investigators and researchers have been generally 
effective in determining the what of the event, but they are not as effective in addressing 
the ‘why’ of the event. The why of an event very often involves the human factors 
associated with that mishap.”173 In an attempt to capture this near-miss information, the 
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FAA created an anonymous reporting system that encouraged those in the airline industry 
to report specific incidents or concerns that affect industry safety. Knowing that employees 
would be hesitant to admit violations for fear of discipline, the FAA turned to NASA to 
develop and administer the program.  
In recognition of the need for more and better information concerning 
operational and human problems in the United State’s [sic] National 
Aviation System, the Federal Aviation Administration in May, 1975, 
implemented an Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP), whose 
purpose was to improve the flow of information of possible significance to 
air safety investigations and research. To encourage the submission of 
reports, the agency officered a limited waiver of disciplinary action to those 
who provided timely information concerning incident, and to others 
involved in those incidents, unless the occurrences involved a criminal 
offense, an aircraft accident, reckless operation, willful misconduct or gross 
negligence.174 
The concept of this reporting system addresses the need to identify why an incident 
occurred. It is focused on the system model of correcting errors in a safety system. In its 
current state, it would seem impossible to imagine that law enforcement could ever make 
use of such a system. That thought was evident in the airline industry as well. Despite this 
concern, after forty years of anonymous reporting, the Automated Reporting System 
(ASRS) recorded 1.4 million reports in 2016.175 
Soon after the implementation of ASRS, other countries recognized the value of 
such a system. Countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia started their own 
confidential reporting systems to improve aviation safety.176 The medical community 
realized the value of an anonymous reporting system to improve their patient care. In 1997, 
the Veterans Administration reached out to NASA and asked for assistance in 
implementing a reporting system for them.177 That has now spread to the entire medical 
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community, which incorporated the aspects of anonymous reporting and immunity from 
discipline in most situations. Researchers found that: 
the ASRS as a proven, effective system for confidential reporting is an 
exemplary model for application across industries interested in safety 
improvements. This model, where the “devil is in the details,” can be 
replicated, adapted, and evolved to be an intuitive, productive information 
collection mechanism for safety improvement in any system.178 
4. The Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System and the National Fire 
Incident Reporting System 
In recent years, public safety organizations have also taken note of anonymous 
reporting systems. The fire service implemented its own near-miss system in 2005. Known 
as the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System (NMRS), the system is “voluntary, 
confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire 
fighter safety.”179 The program established three goals at its implementation: 
1. To give firefighters the opportunity to learn from each other through real 
life-life experiences. 
2. To help formulate strategies to reduce the frequency of firefighter injuries 
and fatalities.  
3. To enhance the safety culture of the fire and emergency service.180 
In addition to the Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System, the fire service also 
makes use of the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) maintained by the U.S. 
Fire Administration. Established in 2005, the NFIRS is used by all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. In the first ten years of its use, over 216 million reports were entered 
in to the NFIRS’ system.181 This reporting system allows the fire service to document its 
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activity using a common language in a common system. It is also available at no cost to 
the agency. The NIFRS system allows agencies to understand “what” they and other 
agencies are doing. The NFIRS system tells the agency and profession how they are 
performing in terms of safety. Together, the profession has the necessary data and 
information to perform an in-depth hazard analysis and make appropriate changes to 
promote safety and a culture of safety. 
5. Law Enforcement Near Miss Reporting 
Trying to build on the success of the NASA system for airlines and the Firefighter 
Near Miss system, law enforcement implemented its own near-miss reporting system in 
2014.182 Funded by the DoJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Law 
Enforcement Near Miss Reporting System was developed and maintained by the Police 
Foundation.183 The Police Foundation identified the overall goal of the near-miss system 
is to “improve officer safety nationwide by helping law enforcement personnel share near 
miss information and providing analysis of the events and information that can be used to 
avoid future near misses and critical incidents.”184 Despite having many of the same 
features as the model systems of the airline industry and fire service, such as anonymity 
and expanding general knowledge of safety, the law enforcement near-miss system is not 
enjoying the success of other such programs. A simple count of the reports available on the 
website shows that seventy reports have been entered since October of 2014.185 
Comparing this to the Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System   , the 2016 annual report 
shows that more than 5,000 reports have been entered in the first ten years of use.186 No 
annual report could be found for the law enforcement near-miss system. There may be 
many reasons why the law enforcement system seems to be unsuccessful. It is new and 
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may not be as publicized as the other programs or officers may still be suspicious of the 
system and their ability to remain anonymous. Most probably, it is less successful because 
law enforcement as a profession does not have a safety culture nor a systematic approach 
to safety. Despite trying to implement systems like other professions that have proven 
successful, law enforcement lacks all the underlying systems to promote safety. There is 
no common incident reporting system like the fire service. There is no support from OSHA 
or state safety organizations. Most importantly, there are no investigative authorities or 
consequences to improper or nonexistent law enforcement safety programs. In the model 
programs of the airline industry and the fire service, there are numerous investigative 
authorities and consequences to non-compliance of accepted standards. 
D. THE MEDICAL INDUSTRY AND DR. REASON 
Like other professions, the medical industry did not rapidly embrace the concept of 
a safety system. The concepts of Reason are now pervasive and well documented, but that 
took time. Dr. Lucian Leape noted in 1994 that 
the most important reason physicians and nurses have not developed more 
effective methods of error prevention is that they have a great deal of 
difficulty in dealing with human error when it does occur. The reasons are 
to be found in the culture of medical practice.187 
This same attitude can be attributed to law enforcement today. It is even more 
important for law enforcement to get it right. In 1999, Dr. Leape estimated that one million 
people a year are injured by errors committed by hospital personnel and 120,000 patients 
die from those mistakes.188 In the same year, 294 persons were justifiably killed by law 
enforcement.189 Despite the numbers, the medical community faces little scrutiny while 
law enforcement is continually scrutinized at a high level and very publicly.  
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When asked what the greatest impediment to the medical community reducing 
errors is, Dr. Leape replied, “we punish people for making mistakes.”190 Again, Dr. Leape 
could be speaking of law enforcement today.  
In the field of criminal justice, the concept of punishment to fit the crime 
has been changed to the concept of treatment to fit the individual offender. 
This change should also be applied to the disciplining of policemen. The 
police supervisor should have a wide range of possible alternatives so that 
action can be made to fit the individual officer and the circumstances. The 
first step in arriving at a solution of a disciplinary problem is to get all of 
the facts, including the officer’s past history, and the underlying causes of 
the misconduct.191 
The above was written by Douglas Gourley in 1950. The case he makes is very similar to 
the one made by Reason and others concerning human error and correction. Despite the 
progress made in other professions, law enforcement is actually going the other direction. 
Many agencies across the United States have adopted disciplinary matrixes. These matrixes 
allow little flexibility in correcting human error and emphasize punishment as the only 
solution. For example, the Madison Wisconsin Police Department has implemented a 
matrix system. They explain it as,  
The matrix lists both code of conduct violations and Standard Operating 
Procedural (SOP) violations. it then provides sanction categories A through 
E. The least punitive sanctions are category A, with sanctions becoming 
more severe as the categories progress to category E.192 
Supporters of the matrix will argue that it promotes fairness and allows for flexibility. They 
miss the main point that all the research indicates most human errors are caused by the 
system. Nothing in the matrix addresses that system or environment that produced the error.  
When speaking of the medical profession, Don Norman could have also been 
addressing law enforcement when he said, 
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People make errors, which lead to accidents. Accidents lead to deaths. The 
standard solution is to blame the people involved. If we find out who made 
the errors and punish them, we solve the problem, right? Wrong. The 
problem is seldom the fault of an individual; it is the fault of the system. 
Change the people without changing the system and the problems will 
continue.193 
Gourley also pointed to a non-punitive self-reporting system in 1950 when he said, 
“Even where there is a clear case of neglect, it is better to have the officer voluntarily tell 
about it.”194 Despite so many professions moving toward and adopting the safety systems 
and safety culture envisioned by Reason and others, law enforcement remains rooted in 
traditional thinking that has been proven ineffective. In fact, leading writers and thinkers 
like those at the Harvard Kennedy School and the National Institute of Justice as recently 
as 2011 described police discipline as: 
The purpose of police discipline is to help employees serve the public while 
staying within the framework of law, policy, procedures. Training and 
organizational expectations for their behavior. Effective discipline requires 
that employees understand these boundaries and expectations. When 
officers stray, measured consequences are consistently and fairly applied to 
hold them accountable and to change their behavior.195 
Clearly, the profession of law enforcement, and those who hope to have influence 
over it, are still advocating what Reason calls the person model of correcting human error. 
In fact, Stephen’s article recognizes and endorses the use of disciplinary matrixes. Until 
this overall philosophy changes, little can be accomplished to instill a safety culture in the 
law enforcement profession.  
We have already noted that the medical profession has adopted many or all the 
safety culture pieces identified by Reason. They have gone a step further by creating a 
matrix to identify why a human error occurred. Thus, they are considering the system and 
environment of the error instead of simply blaming the human.  
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Two models were explored for their adaptability for law enforcement. The first 
(Table 3) is simplistic and useful to explain the concept. It focuses on when different 
remedial actions are appropriate.  




If we look at the first row as a question, it allows us to categorize the nature of the human 
behavior. Once that has been determined, the supervisor or organization can apply the 
appropriate form of remedial action. The problem with the model is that it is again solely 
focused on the errors made by humans. Nowhere does it consider the system or 
environment the human is operating in when the error is made. As a result, this model is 
only of little more value than the disciplinary matrix. 
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Thankfully, the medical profession has given us another model that is readily 
adaptable to law enforcement. The Incident Decision Tree was developed by the National 
Patient Safety Agency in the United Kingdom with the acknowledged assistance of Dr. 
Reason.197 The supervisor or organization uses the tool by answering a series of guided 
questions about the individual’s actions, motives, and behavior at the time of the 
incident.198 The tool moves the user from deliberate harm to substitution. At one end is an 
intentional act accomplishing expected outcomes, and the other may involve human error 
that was brought about by latent errors in the system or organization. It is the only tool 
reviewed that took in to account the system and the environment when analyzing human 
error. Additionally, remediation involved far more then disciplining the human. 
E. THE FOUR TESTS OF THE INCIDENT DECISION TREE 
It has already been discussed and well documented that determining the reason for 
errors in high-risk organizations can be a complicated task. Few organizations devote the 
proper time, money, or personnel to effectively improve safety through reporting, 
documentation, research, and remediation. It is far more expedient to blame and shame. 
The Incident Decision Tree, as it appears in Figure 6, forces the user to slow the process 
down and make appropriate decision at each step in the tree. There are four distinct tests 
that provide the user with the most likely cause of the error. Once the cause of the error is 
properly identified, it can be properly addressed. 
1. The Deliberate Harm Test 
The Deliberate Harm Test is there to eliminate the very rare cases when an 
individual intentionally deviates from acceptable behavior and achieves a desired outcome 
that is unwanted and unacceptable. This type of conduct does nothing to further the goals 
of the organization or the profession. Thankfully, with proper hiring, training, and policy 
development, very few violations should be identified in this area. This is also why a focus 
on the person model of remediation, resulting in blaming and discipline, does little to fix 
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the problem in most cases. However, errors identified as Deliberate Harm are the most 
appropriate to receive immediate corrective action to include discipline or termination. 
2. The Incapacity Test 
The Incapacity Test determines if substance abuse or ill health caused or 
contributed to the incident. This test would also look at self-medication that could impact 
physical performance or decision-making. Though not specifically mentioned in the 
literature, it may also be appropriate to look at issues such as sleep deprivation. The results 
of a study conducted on 5000 police officers in   the United States concluded,     “the data 
showed that just over 40 percent of police officers screened positive for sleep disorders- 
almost double the 15 to 20 percent estimated rate of sleep disorders in the general 
population.”199 Such discoveries do not absolve the employee of the error. Instead, it 
guides the supervisor or user of the tool closer to identifying possible root causes.  
3. The Foresight Test 
The Foresight Test is the next step in the process if the employee’s actions were not 
intentional and it is determined the employee was not incapacitated. The research indicates 
that this step can be the most informative for the organization and identify root causes of 
errors. It is here that policies, procedures, and protocols are reviewed. The reviewer will 
determine if proper protocols exist and if they do, were they followed. If they exist and 
were ignored, the reviewer will determine if the employee had a reason for deviating from 
the accepted practice. Where this deviates from the discipline matrix is it allows for an 
analysis beyond determining if a violation of policy occurred. It could be possible that the 
policy is outdated or no longer valid. This thought process is what allows the “system” 
review that is crucial to improving performance and enhancing safety.  
The term “unacceptable risk” is defined as an unreasonable risk by the employee in 
terms of the Decision Tree. The creators of the tool realized that the profession involves 
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risk. During the Foresight Test, the supervisor attempts to discern if the actions taken by 
the employee were unreasonable given the circumstances, environment, and motivation for 
taking the action. They do not focus on the potential consequences of the action to 
determine if it was proper. If that were true, any bad outcome could result in the action 
being unreasonable simple because the result was not as intended. Again, this concept 
transfers nicely to law enforcement and the Reasonable Test that resulted in the Supreme 
Court decision in Graham v. Connor. The Court ruled that 
the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry is whether the officers’ 
actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. 
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must 
embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 
make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a 
particular situation.200 
The creators of the Decision Tree, like the justices of the Supreme Court, 
understood the need to review employee actions in the context of the moment and apply a 
reasonableness test and not just call balls and strikes on potential policy violations.  
4. The Substitution Test 
The Substitution Test is the final step in the process and is used if the previous three 
did not properly complete the review of the incident. In this phase, the employee is 
substituted for someone else with a similar background, training, and experience. The 
supervisor tries to determine if this substitute person would have acted similarly. Dr. 
Reason describes the Substitution Test as: 
Substitute the individual concerned, for someone else coming from the 
same domain of activity and possessing comparable qualifications and 
experience. Then ask the question “In the light of how events unfolded and 
were perceived by those involved in real time, is it likely that this new 
individual would have behaved any differently?”201 
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This concept should be familiar to law enforcement. As noted, it is like the ruling in 
Graham v. Connor.  
During the Substitution Test, the organization can review deficiencies in 
supervision, policy, training, and team effectiveness. None of these are commonly found 
during law enforcement disciplinary reviews. Again, the disciplinary matrix does not 
provide a formal method for these deficiencies to enter the record. The medical community 
has found, like the airline industry, that systems must be improved for humans to succeed 
in today’s high-risk, fast-paced, and technology-intensive work environments. Law 
enforcement should commit to this same mindset.  
 
Figure 6.  National Health Service (United Kingdom) Incident Decision Tree202 
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F. CHAPTER REVIEW 
Professions in the United States and across the world have improved their safety 
systems beyond the concepts found in the OSH Act. They have changed the philosophy of 
their work environment to foster what Dr. Reason calls a safety culture. Dr. Reason’s work 
is highly regarded in the aviation and medical communities. They have taken his concepts 
and created very successful systematic processes to foster a culture of safety within the 
individual organization and profession. Dr. Reason’s work is now being used in the fire 
service. Given this success, it is apparent that law enforcement can learn from these 
professions and adapt its own safety culture.  
By using tools like the Incident Decision Tree, law enforcement can discern the 
root causes of errors. Administrators can see the value of evaluating errors using the system 
model instead of the traditional person model. They will also understand and apply the 
concepts of human factors and human errors when trying to identify hazards and mitigate 
them successfully. By following Dr. Reason’s components of a safety culture, law 
enforcement can reverse the current escalating trend of officer deaths and injuries. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis concludes by projecting a recommended path forward. This roadmap 
provides agency executives, elected officials, and academics a path to follow to improve 
law enforcement safety through a systematic process. This chapter explores the outcomes 
of following the roadmap and comparing the suggested roadmap to the status quo today. 
This comparison is based on cost, legality, political acceptance, level of effort, and 
effectiveness. Then, the chapter recommends a solution based on all the evidence available. 
Finally, the thesis concludes by telling the story of law enforcement safety in the future. 
A. RECOMMENDED PATH: A ROADMAP TO IMPROVED OFFICER 
SAFETY THROUGH A SYSTEMATIC PROCESS 
The roadmap suggested here includes two phases that can overlap and potentially 
run concurrent with each other. The first, following the OSHA model, must be well 
established before implementing the lessons applied by Dr. Reason. The roadmap is new 
to the law enforcement profession but well-traveled by others. Their experiences helped to 
shape the proposed path for law enforcement.  
1. Follow the OSHA Model 
The first step to improving law enforcement safety through a systematic process is 
to follow the OSHA model. Federal OSHA and state equivalents need to educate law 
enforcement executives and agencies in the processes of hazard identification, mitigation, 
and evaluation. These same organizations then need to evaluate the effectiveness of 
agencies implementing these required processes and take appropriate action when 
deficiencies are identified. This will require that federal and state safety organization hire 
subject matter experts in the area of law enforcement just as they have in the areas of fire 
safety, construction, and other high-risk professions.  
To facilitate hazard identification, the Congress needs to enact legislation requiring 
accurate data collection and dissemination as required in air traffic safety and the medical 
profession. A national system of law enforcement safety information is often written about 
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but has failed to become reality. It is time it has the weight of law and be enforced like 
other professions. 
Organizations like National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) should conduct 
investigations into law enforcement line-of-duty deaths like those conducted after 
firefighter deaths. Again, this will require these organizations to hire subject matter experts 
from the area of law enforcement and conduct reviews based on policy, command and 
control, communications, proper use of safety equipment, and all the similar areas to those 
reviewed after the Sofa Sleeper fire mentioned earlier.  
Lacking action by Congress or interest by safety organizations, law enforcement 
executives should still take steps to implement the OSHA standards required by law under 
the General Duty Clause of the OSH Act. This thesis argues that, ultimately, it may be 
lawyers who compel the law enforcement profession to improve through civil litigation 
after a line-of-duty death. Law enforcement executives and elected officials would be wise 
to begin such processes now and demonstrate a systematic approach to improve safety.  
2. Follow Other Professions’ Examples: Implement the Principles of Dr. 
James Reason 
Once the profession and individual agencies have laid the foundation required by 
OSHA standards and processes, they should follow the lead of other professions to 
implement the principles of Dr. Reason. Some of this could be done concurrently with the 
OSHA compliance but must build on that groundwork being established.  
Dr. Reason has impacted several professions with his work on establishing entire 
systems of safety and the components that are necessary for success. If done correctly, as 
demonstrated by other professions, the result will be an entire safety culture for the 
profession and individual agencies. 
An example of the components identified by public safety agencies in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, in 2014, as adapted from Reason’s examples, Figure 7 was used during training to 
express the systematic approach to safety and the creation of an effective safety culture. 
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Figure 7.  Model Used by Indianapolis Public Safety to Demonstrate Components of 
a Safety System, Based on James Reason’s Work203 
The best example found during research for this thesis to express the application of 
this concept was found in published works by the Australian Civil Aviation Authority. In 
implementing Reason’s systematic approach to safety and development of a safety culture, 
they published eight safety management system (SMS) printed resources for education and 
implementation. They are: 
• SMS 1: Safety Management Basics204 
                                                 
203 Source: Joseph Finch, James King, and Willie Thompson, “Creating a Safety Culture” 
(PowerPoint, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, November 2014). 
204 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 1. 
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• SMS 2: Safety Policy and Objectives205 
• SMS 3: Safety Risk Management206 
• SMS 4: Safety Assurance207 
• SMS 5: Safety Promotion208 
• SMS 6: Human Factors209 
• SMS 7: SMS for Small, Non-Complex Organizations210 
• SMS 8: Resource Kit Workbook211 
The law enforcement profession should create a similar education series to assist 
agency heads, elected officials, and training officers when implementing a system of safety 
and the resulting safety culture. Agencies should also change from the person form of 
review, which focuses on blame, and move to the system model. The system model is more 
focused on fixing the problem by asking why things occur. Law enforcement could adapt 
the Decision Tree developed by the medical community to assist in finding the root cause 
of accidents and performance issues.  
                                                 
205 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 2: Safety Policy and Objectives, second edition (Canberra: 
Australian Government, December 2014), https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_assets/main/ 
sms/download/2014-sms-book2-safety-policy-objectives.pdf. 
206 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 3: Safety Risk Management, second edition (Canberra: 
Australian Government, December 2014), www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_assets/main/sms/ 
download/2014-sms-book3-safety-risk-management.pdf. 
207 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 4: Safety Assurance, second edition (Canberra: Australian 
Government, December 2014), www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_assets/main/sms/download/2014-
sms-book4-safety-assurance.pdf. 
208 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 5: Safety Promotion, second edition (Canberra: Australian 
Government, December 2014), www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_assets/main/sms/download/2014-
sms-book5-safety-promotion.pdf. 
209Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS6. 
210 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 7: SMS for Small, Non-complex Organizations, second 
edition(Canberra: Australian Government, December 2014), www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_ 
assets/main/sms/download/2014-sms-book7-sms-small-non-complex-organisations.pdf. 
211 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, SMS 8: Resource Kit Workbook, second edition (Canberra: 
Australian Government, December 2014), www.casa.gov.au/sites/g/files/net351/f/_assets/main/sms/ 
download/2014-sms-book8-workbook.pdf. 
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The airline industry and the fire service have advanced near-miss reporting systems 
that should be modeled for law enforcement. Again, federal law would be helpful in 
establishing confidentiality and disciplinary limitations. A standardized national reporting 
system, like that of the fire service would also be beneficial for law enforcement. Rather 
than require compliance in systems like the Uniform Crime Reports or the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System, the FBI should develop a national system that agencies 
can access online. Agencies could customize any additional data collection by using 
relational databases that would be seamless to the user. Such a system would also collect 
safety information that is desperately lacking now. Even though much of this should be the 
work of the federal government, agency heads and elected officials should begin the effort 
now at the state and local levels. 
Reason’s work in the area of human error should be of particular interest to law 
enforcement. Concepts such as tunnel vision, auditory exclusion, reaction time, and the 
need for rest periods are just now beginning to be understood in a meaningful way. Work 
done by Dr. Bill Lewinski and his staff at the Force Science Institute are using a scientific 
process to explain the actual perceptions and abilities of an officer in critical situations. 
When identifying hazards and mitigation strategies, such insight will prove invaluable. 
Much like the work of Reason in exploring the total environment in which an error 
occurred, Force Science is an applicable tool for law enforcement to do the same. The 
previous example of officers involved in vehicle crashes is one example of the rapidly 
changing environment in which law enforcement officers work on a regular basis. 
B. PROJECTED OUTCOMES 
The projected outcomes presented here are based firmly on the research, 
documentation, and observed success achieved by other industries and professions. It was 
not necessary in this thesis to provide a list of the numerous entities currently benefiting 
from a systematic approach to safety. That was previously accomplished by Maggie 
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DeBoard in her thesis in December 2015.212 Instead, the outcomes projected here are 
reasonable and obtainable as long as the desire exists to improve law enforcement safety. 
1. Improve Awareness of Safety as a Systematic Process in Law 
Enforcement 
As previously argued here, and documented by others, law enforcement has no 
semblance of a systematic approach to safety or a safety culture. Should the law 
enforcement profession, or a single agency, choose to follow the roadmap, the outcomes 
below will be achieved. 
a. Documented Safety Information 
As required by OSHA and proven by Reason, documentation is the heart of hazard 
identification and mitigation. Like other professions and industries, law enforcement may 
find it necessary to create safety units that create, manage, and disseminate safety 
information. The focused individuals will be in the best position to identify trends often 
overlooked with latent conditions and go beyond active failures. 
b. Identified Hazards 
One of the most significant achievable projections is true hazard identification. By 
moving beyond blaming and shaming the person and looking at the entire system, real 
hazards can be identified and documented. Several examples have been provided 
throughout this thesis. The most informative example for the profession is that, despite 
what many reports, articles, and academics have said for years, the single greatest threat to 
a law enforcement officer is being impacted by a high-velocity projectile. This projectile 
is most often a bullet, and the technology exists to mitigate this hazard. It is important to 
remember that “mitigate” and “eliminate” are not synonymous. In the first six months of 
2018, officer fatalities are up 7 percent from the same period in 2017.213 Firearm-related 
                                                 
212 Maggie A. DeBoard, “Applying Systems Thinking to Law Enforcement Safety: Recommendation 
for a Comprehensive Safety Management Framework” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/47932. 
 213 PoliceOne, “NLEOMF.” 
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incidents are the leading cause of death, and they are up 24 percent from the previous 
year.214 Such an accurate accounting of incidents is necessary to identify hazards and is 
easily obtainable by following the roadmap.  
c. Structured Mitigation Strategies 
W. Edwards Deming observed that, “Without data you’re just another person with 
an opinion.”215 Advocates of a systematic approach to safety would wholeheartedly agree. 
By properly documenting safety information related to incidents and using that information 
to accurately identify hazards, created structured mitigation strategies become the next 
achievable outcome of following the roadmap. As noted earlier, law enforcement often 
spends money on safety equipment with no clearly defined hazard and no policy on the 
wear and maintenance of the safety equipment. The systematic approach will facilitate the 
law enforcement profession in mitigation specific hazards and improving the overall safety 
culture of an organization. 
d. Measurable Results  
Once mitigation strategies have been properly implemented, measuring their 
effectiveness becomes the next projected outcome. Law Enforcement agencies often invest 
money in training and equipment that is thought to improve some observed safety or 
performance issue. Rarely are these strategies continually evaluated for their effectiveness 
in meeting the original objective. 
By following the roadmap, agencies will make intelligent decisions on mitigation 
strategies and continually monitor their effectiveness. This is achieved through data 
collection, articulable observations, and modification when necessary. 
                                                 
214 PoliceOne. 
215 Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn, “Without an Opinion, You’re Just Another Person with 
Data,” Forbes, March 15, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/silberzahnjones/2016/03/15/without-an-
opinion-youre-just-another-person-with-data/. 
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e. Lessons-Learned Data Available to the Entire Law Enforcement 
Profession 
By implementing the roadmap and following the steps outlined earlier, the law 
enforcement profession will be able to share lessons learned data and information as other 
industries and professions have done for years. The systematic process will allow a 
common language and understanding when reviewing reporting information and the data 
that results from them. Published accounts of mitigation strategies and their measured 
results will encourage improved safety systems to protect officers. Traditional best-practice 
fads will give way to tested and proven mitigation strategies that resulted from proper 
review, identification, and implementation. The recommended national repository will 
make this information available to all agencies. When an incident is reviewed at the local, 
state, or national level, this information will be part of the assessment on which to base 
conclusions. 
2. Achieve a Safety Culture in the Law Enforcement Profession 
Like other high-risk profession and industries, law enforcement does not naturally 
possess a culture of safety. Too often, the risk becomes part of the persona of the 
profession, and hazard mitigation suffers for it. The research is clear, however, that a safety 
culture can be, and has been, successfully implemented, nurtured, and maintained in 
numerous high-risk industries and professions. Law enforcement should be no exception. 
Project outcomes of creating this culture will include the following, just to highlight a few. 
a. Policy Decisions Will Include a Discussion of Safety Concerns 
Elected officials and police administrators have always balanced officer safety and 
the perception the public has of an agency and the profession as a whole. Shortly after the 
Ferguson, Missouri, riots, calls against police militarization resulted in President Obama 
making it more difficult for police departments to obtain some safety equipment from 
military surplus programs. Hot-button issues continued to resonate from organizations like 
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the American Civil Liberties Union calling on police agencies to not use, or limit the use 
of, helmets and plated vests or have access to armored vehicles.216 
After the murder of five Dallas police officers, calls limiting safety equipment to 
law enforcement have mostly gone silent. Agencies rushed to purchase ballistic helmets 
and vests. On the local level, this issue remains a concern. The Bloomington, Indiana, 
Police Department recently decided to purchase an armored vehicle for the safety of its 
officers and citizens. The local Black Lives Matter group argued that the “BearCat could 
be used to stop peaceful protests and harm people of color.”217 The Bloomington mayor 
argued that the BearCat was “designed to protect police during high-risk situations 
involving firearms.”218 This contradiction in understanding can be overcome by 
implementing the roadmap.  
By conducting proper research and hazard identification, mitigation strategies like 
the BearCat can be properly explained and the public educated. Proper policy formation is 
critical to the success of any profession with a healthy safety culture. The formation process 
of agency policy must include an analysis of risk factors associated with the policy 
decision. To purchase a BearCat or to not purchase patrol rifles must be based on the risk 
assessment and not the political cloud that forms around a decision. Without such courage 
by elected officials and agency heads, a safety culture in law enforcement will remain 
unattainable.  
b. Budgets Factor in Safety Training and Protective Equipment 
By following the roadmap, agencies will be able to anticipate the funding 
requirements of establishing and maintaining a safety culture. As noted after the Dallas 
murder of five officers, emergency spending often follows a tragedy. The problem with 
                                                 
216 American Civil Liberties Union, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American 
Policing (Washington, DC: ACLU Foundation, June 2014), 22, www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/jus14-warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf. 
217 Lauren Bavis, “BearCat Armored Vehicle Coming to Bloomington,” Herald Times Online, March 




this often-repeated process is that no systematic process exists to create policy, maintain 
the equipment, or purchase future equipment. It serves only to satisfy the immediate need 
to give the impression of doing something after a tragedy. 
When safety is promoted through a systematic process and a culture of safety 
results, the need to create emergency funding streams should be illuminated. The process 
of budgeting for safety becomes a realistic projected outcome of following the roadmap. 
c. Incident Reviews Include Asking Why 
As noted repeatedly by Reason, an agency or profession hoping to achieve a safety 
culture must move away from the person model to the system model of review. Instead of 
asking “who” and finding an individual to blame, the system model asks “why” an incident 
or accident happened at all. The result is real review, insightful documentation, proper 
mitigation, and an improved safety environment for all employees. By following the 
roadmap, the law enforcement profession and individual agencies can have a positive 
impact on the lives of individual officers and create the needed culture of safety.  
3. Law Enforcement Will Improve Overall Professionalism 
Since at least the 1970s, a significant effort has been made to increase the education 
level of police officers. Some agencies required two or four-year degrees to apply. The 
goal of such requirements was to make law enforcement more professional. Many agencies 
who adopted such policies have reversed their decision to increase their applicant pool and 
encourage the many military veterans to contribute to law enforcement. The goal of 
increased professionalism still exists. By following the roadmap, the profession and 
individual agencies will see the benefit of continued knowledge growth, improved decision 
making, adaptability, and compliance to improved standards. Increased professionalism 
and creating a culture of safety are mutually supportive. 
4. Standards Will Be Documented and Understood 
By including a systematic approach to safety in policy, training, and equipment 
acquisition, best practices will begin to emerge based on valid documentation and research 
and proven mitigation strategies. This process will cause standards to be developed, 
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modified, and reviewed utilizing the new information and higher-level expectations. Since 
the underlying research will already exist, it will be self-evident to include safety 
considerations in to standards of expectation. As noted previously, the review of the Sofa 
Sleeper fire included many instances of established standards not being followed. Such a 
practice in law enforcement would be revolutionary and improve professionalism more 
profoundly than many of the previous attempts.  
The roadmap is clear that the initial formation of standards must begin with OSHA 
and the state equivalents. The fire service and every other high-risk profession are required 
to follow numerous standards to keep their employee’s safe. It is time for law enforcement 
to be included among this group. By implementing Reason’s principles, law enforcement 
will continue to grow and improve based on documented evidence and not the political 
temperament of the day. Once agencies and individual officers understand they will be held 
accountable for established standards, they will work to improve and create the desired 
safety culture. 
a. Deficiencies Will Be Identified and Corrected 
The observation was made previously that researchers traditionally track law 
enforcement deaths and injuries in two broad categories: traffic accidents and felonious 
assaults. Most programs designed to improve officer safety focus on these categories and 
develop strategies to improve safety. An example of this is the recent Below 100 initiative. 
This program was created by some of the best thinkers and trainers associated with law 
enforcement. Its stated mission is to “influence law enforcement culture by providing 
innovating training and awareness through presentations, social media, and webinars on 
identifying the leading causes and current trends in preventable line-of-duty deaths and 
injuries.”219 
The goal is to reduce line-of-duty deaths to below 100 per year, which has not 
occurred since 1943.220 The content of this program is excellent. It is accurate in its 
                                                 
219 Below 100, accessed July 19, 2016, http://below100.org/. 
220 Below 100. 
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presentation and adaptable to evolve over time as threats change. The program has five 
principle ideas to improve safety. 
• Wear Your (Seat) Belt 
• Wear Your Vest 
• Watch Your Speed 
• WIN—What’s Important Now? 
• Remember: Complacency Kills!221 
The program focuses on peer pressure from supervisors and fellow officers to 
encourage the proper and safe behavior by officers. This is an excellent program and one 
consistent with safety thinking in law enforcement. The culture they want to influence is 
the police culture. They are not attempting to create a culture of safety within law 
enforcement to the standard that would be acceptable in other professions. OSHA does not 
have oversight of this social program and it would qualify only as an initial step in Reason’s 
safety culture.  
By following the roadmap, law enforcement can move beyond social pressure. 
Deficiencies, or hazards, that have been identified must be mitigated. Documentation is 
crucial to identifying trends and suggesting mitigation strategies. It is only the first step. 
Strategies must be implemented with authority. By following the roadmap, such authority 
exists in the policies and expectations that are established over time, beginning with single 
agencies and evolving to the profession as a whole. The Below 100 project demonstrates 
that the entire profession can be engaged and learn from one another. A national system 
rooted in OSHA standards begins that foundation. From that foundation, efforts can 
progress to Reason’s safety culture and beyond the peer pressure of Below 100.  
                                                 
221 Below 100. 
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b. Once Corrected, Performance Will Be Monitored and Measured for 
Compliance 
On April 10, 2014, the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) entered in to an 
agreement with the DoJ to reform the way it provided police services. The report focused 
on using deadly force too often, using less lethal force too often, systemic deficiencies in 
oversight, training and policy, to name a few.222 In the forty-one-page report, officer safety 
was mentioned once. The single reference was to highlight the background of law 
enforcement experts.  
On November 2, 2017, the federal monitor of the APD released their sixth report. 
Officer safety is mentioned eleven times in 439 pages. Eight of these occurrences are 
identical sentences stating, “To maintain high-level, quality service; to ensure officer safety 
and accountability; and promote constitutional, effective policing, APD agrees to…”223 
The other three uses of officer safety in 439 pages are also nearly identical and refer to an 
instructor presentation of material. 
As noted earlier, as part of the roadmap, officer safety must be considered in all 
aspects of policy, budget, training, and review. Like other department reviews conducted 
by the DoJ, the Albuquerque report and follow-on Monitor’s report provide an excellent 
example of how deficiencies, including safety, can be documented, remediated, and 
monitored for continued compliance. In fact, the initial report actually uses this same 
terminology when talking about what APD must do to comply with the agreement. Such 
documentation, remediation, and review are what Reason requires to create the safety 
culture. What is lacking is the vision or willingness of law enforcement to recognize this 
necessity.  
Many of the discussions surrounding the numerous DoJ investigations included talk 
of improving professionalism in policing. By conducting thorough investigations like those 
done by the DoJ, with the addition of safety concerns, law enforcement will reinforce the 
                                                 
222 Samuels and Martinez, “Albuquerque Police Department,” 1. 
223 James Ginger, “Compliance Levels of the Albuquerque Police Department and the City of 
Albuquerque with Requirements of the Court-Approved Settlement Agreement” (report, U.S. Department 
of Justice, November 2017), 217, https://www.justice.gov/usao-nm/page/file/1007876/download. 
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desire of everyone to improve the profession. Nothing new need be created to accomplish 
this projected outcome. The profession just needs to do it.  
c. Common Best Practices Will Be Validated and Shared beyond Academic 
Thought and Budget Cycles 
It has been noted several times previously that law enforcement lacks sufficient 
data to design knowledge-based solutions or mitigation strategies to hazards to improve 
officer safety. Per Deming, this allows everyone to have an opinion as to what programs, 
strategies, research, or investigations should be conducted. By following the roadmap, for 
the first time, law enforcement would have all of the necessary elements to create and apply 
a systematic process to safety in law enforcement. The pinnacle of this effort would be the 
creation of a safety culture.  
To create the safety culture, of even a systematic process, law enforcement will 
have to break the cycle of disorganized academic research and grant programs that are not 
measured for success or designed to build on successive programs. By collecting data as 
suggesting in the roadmap, safety will be a systematic and consistent effort. 
Professionalism will improve across law enforcement by sharing safety data and validated 
mitigation strategies, and sharing that information nationally.  
Systems like the Near-Miss Reporting System and safety reporting data required 
by OSHA or future legislation by Congress will further data collection and acquired 
knowledge. With this information and data, academics can now move beyond having 
opinions and work for solutions that may evolve over time. Continual assessment and 
evaluation will allow continued growth and improvement. At this point, increased 
professionalism and a culture of safety should result as a projected outcome. 
C. CONFRONT THE TRADE-OFFS OF THE SUGGESTED POLICY WITH 
WHAT IS BEING DONE TODAY 
In all organizations, particularly government, policy decisions always include 
trade-offs. Most of these trade-offs involve some balancing of cost, legality, political 




Even a quick evaluation of cost reveals that there will be no initial cost savings 
when implementing the roadmap. Existing safety equipment and training will need to be 
maintained or upgraded. A standard ballistic vest worn daily by officers can cost upward 
of $750 for III A protection. A vest with rifle-resistant plates can cost over $500. A ballistic 
helmet is upward of $200. An armored vehicle like the BearCat costs $200,000 to 
$400,000. These are just a few examples of equipment costs that may be necessary to 
mitigate identified hazards. 
Additional cost will be incurred to pay for significant training in the area of OSHA 
and other safety standards. As noted previously, the fire service receives significant annual 
safety training including policy, standards, and law. Law enforcement should be expected 
to be as proficient as the fire service and other hazardous professions and industries.  
Potential saving will eventually be realized in a reduction of civil litigation costs. 
Since law enforcement has few policies concerning safety, they must explain their actions 
on a case-by-case basis. As evident in the DoJ reviews, many agencies did not even have 
a system of review to determine if their actions were in line with their own policies. As a 
result, trends that should have been identified went unnoticed until it was too late. The cost 
in loss of confidence by the community and a damaged reputation is also a cost that is 
difficult to calculate but real nonetheless.  
If law enforcement does not follow the roadmap and maintains the status quo, their 
cost may appear to stay the same for a time. Sooner or later, events will overtake the elected 
officials and agency heads. Much like the shooting in Dallas caused emergency spending 
by agencies across the country to purchase rifle-resistant protective equipment, threats will 
continue to emerge and purchases will continue to be made.  
The greatest cost may be realized by surviving family members of officers killed in 
the line of duty. Eventually, attorneys will recognize that law enforcement is not compliant 
with expected safety standards. The benchmark of this practice is established in the fire 
service already. Surviving family members have often sued individuals and agencies for 
failing to follow safety practices, including OSHA standards and the requirements of 
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Incident Command. Such occurrences bring the same loss of confidence and damaged 
reputation as a negative report by the DoJ. It is potentially costlier as well.  
2. Legality 
A major premise of this thesis is that federal law enforcement agencies and many 
state and local police departments are subject to OSHA law and standards. Even though 
specific standards are nonexistent for law enforcement, the General Duty Clause required 
law enforcement to conduct risk assessments and mitigate identified hazards. It is in this 
area that civil attorneys will apply the law representing surviving family members of 
officers killed in the line of duty. Elected officials and agency leaders should recognize this 
now and begin to follow the roadmap. A systematic approach to safety and the resulting 
safety culture will be the only defense to the civil litigation that will surely come. 
The General Duty Clause already established a legal foundation for agencies to act. 
The proposed action by the Congress to create a national reporting system and strengthen 
the Near-Miss system is still necessary to advance safety in law enforcement. As mentioned 
earlier, it is always easier for governments to maintain the status quo. Reason’s research 
clearly shows the common challenges of implementing changes to how professions and 
industry think about safety. Law enforcement will have a lengthy journey in the best of 
circumstances, and it should start sooner rather than later. 
3. Political Acceptance 
After the recent Dallas police shootings and other ambush-style attacks on law 
enforcement officers across the country, the social and political attitude has lately changed 
in a positive direction. Previously, alleged misconduct officers in Ferguson, Baltimore, and 
New York City, to name a few, had created an environment where safety equipment such 
as helmets, vests, and armored vehicles were being denied for law enforcement agencies. 
Fear of police militarization echoed from the American Civil Liberties Union to the highest 
levels of government. President Obama restricted safety equipment available to law 
enforcement for years by limiting what could be obtained through the Defense 
Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) program. 
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In more recent years the militarization attitude has softened and given way to 
change. President Trump reversed the previous decision and again made safety equipment 
available through the DRMO program. After the ambush attacks, most notably in Dallas, 
agencies across the country purchased and issued helmets and vests rated to mitigate rifle 
fire. It is this recognition and momentum that must be seized upon now to begin 
implementing the roadmap.  
A single instance of alleged misconduct, like what happened in Ferguson, Missouri, 
could set law enforcement safety back years. For this reason, it is imperative that safety 
concerns be removed from the volatile political environment that law enforcement is 
subjected to today. Safety standards based on law, best practice, policy, and acquired safety 
data must be developed.  
A model example of best practice standards based on law, policy, and safety data 
can be found in the fire service. The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) 
Standard 1500 outlines specific safety standards that should be followed by all fire agencies 
and personnel. The International Association of Fire Fighters explains the NPFA 1500 
standard:  
The NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and 
Health Program, was developed to provide a consensus standard for an 
occupational safety and health program for the fire service. The intent of 
this standard is to provide the framework for a safety and health program 
for a fire department or any type of organization providing similar 
services.224 
When the Boston Fire Department reviewed its compliance with this standard, it 
was provided an extensive review of each component by Facets Consulting. Each standard 
was evaluated on current compliance, specific areas in need of attention, cost, effort, time, 
relative priority, and existing best practices (see Table 4).225
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Specific Areas in 
Need of Attention 
Cost Effort Time Relative 
Priority 
Best Practices 
Chapter 4—Fire Department Administration 
4.1 Fire Department 
Organization 
Statement 
Partial There is no single 
written document that 
meets the requirements 
for a fire department 
organizational 
statement 
Low Medium Medium Low  Phoenix4-1 
4.2 Risk Management 
Plan 
No The BFD does not 
have a written risk 
management plan 
Low Medium High High Phoenix4-4 
 
                                                 
228 Adapted from Facets Consulting, 5. The table is not duplicated exactly but is an accurate representation. 
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The review of Boston Fire is a 542-page document and includes sixty separate 
categories based on NFPA 1500. Each was rated as the example in Table 4. Not only does 
the agency receive a compliance rating, they are given examples of best practices based on 
other agencies’ policies. Those policies are created with data collected locally and available 
nationally through the required reporting systems in the fire service. This type of thinking 
and approach to safety is what law enforcement needs: a culture that produces such systems 
and reviews itself considering established standards can remove politics from discussions 
concerning employee safety. As with many of the recommendations of the roadmap, the 
heavy lifting of creating a systematic approach to safety can be found in other high-risk 
professions and industries. In this case, the fire service is well advanced of law 
enforcement. Elected officials, agency heads and academia, just need to apply what already 
exists to law enforcement. 
4. Level of Effort 
A significant level of effort will be necessary to implement the roadmap to establish 
a systematic approach to safety and create a safety culture. Effort will be required by 
elected officials, agency executives, academia, agency supervisors, and line officers. The 
development and implementation effort will need to be sustained for years. Once 
implemented, effort will continue in daily required duties and tasks to make the system 
work. Continuous evaluation of the system, along with necessary changes, will require 
ongoing effort. If the Boston NFPA 1500 assessment is a guide to effort, the sixty 
categories identified for evaluation clearly show the involvement and effort required to 
develop and maintain a safety system for high-risk professions, including law enforcement. 
5. Effectiveness 
If the roadmap is implemented, it will be very effective in reducing the rate and 
occurrence of death and injury in law enforcement. Recent upward trends and near-record 
setting statistics indicate what we are doing now is not working without the existence of a 
systematic, profession-wide approach to safety. As well-documented here, other 
professions and industries have successfully implemented safety systems and created true 
safety cultures. The effectiveness of such systems can be found in the fire service, heavy 
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industry, construction, aviation, and the medical community, to name a few. To implement 
the roadmap will not be easy and will require a sustained effort, lasting years to just initiate. 
All available data indicate that, if the investment is made, the roadmap will prove effective. 
D. DECIDE 
Based on all the research, case studies, law, and policy, with consideration of cost, 
political acceptance, and accepting the necessary tradeoffs, law enforcement must develop 
and implement a systematic approach to safety. Such an approach will eventually lead to 
the goal of establishing a safety culture. If the law enforcement profession continues to 
resist or slowly proceed, the decision will be made for them. As previously documented, 
all of the research and recommendations coming from organizations like PERF or the 
Presidential Task Force are encouraging a systematic approach to law enforcement safety. 
It is time to follow the roadmap and make it mandatory. 
This thesis has given a great deal of credit to other professions and industries that 
have adopted a systematic approach to safety. The fire service has been noted repeatedly 
as having systems in place that could be easily adapted and adopted by law enforcement. 
The safety of each police officer and the profession will benefit considerably by learning 
from the experience of the fire service. Law enforcement would also save considerable 
time and effort by having a model to follow. The fire service continues to implement its 
systematic process and strives to achieve a safety culture. In the early 2000s, a high-ranking 
member of the Chicago Fire Department was heard to say that the fire service was “200 
years of tradition unimpeded by progress.”229 The Chicago Fire Department was in the 
process of upgrading much of its safety equipment at great expense in time and dollars. 
The fire administrator was frustrated that the resistance to change was even greater than 
the appreciation of the improved equipment. Law enforcement will have the same 
challenges but must no longer impede progress in terms of safety. 
As recently as July 2018, ideas of hazard identification, mitigation, and 
documentation continue to enter the law enforcement community. When discussing school 
                                                 
229 Quoted from a personal conversation. 
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safety, the U.S. Secret Service recently advised schools and law enforcement agencies to 
follow their recommended plan. 
The plan includes forming a multidisciplinary threat assessment team, 
establishing central reporting mechanisms, identifying behaviors of 
concern, defining the threshold for law enforcement intervention, 
identifying risk management strategies, promoting safe school climates, and 
providing training to stakeholders. It can also help schools mitigate threats 
from a variety of individuals, including students, employees, or parents.230 
The context is focused on the nation’s schools but the methodology is directly 
consistent with OSHA methodology and Reason’s direction to consider the entire 
environment when trying to improve safety. Though not stated as an objective, the guide 
creates an opportunity for an actual safety culture to develop. This is just another of many 
examples where law enforcement is being required to think in terms of hazard 
identification, mitigation, documentation, and review. The suggested multidisciplinary 
threat-assessment team closely resembles the intent of standards found in the NFPA. It is 
time for law enforcement to join the process that is already well on its way to being required 
and no longer just suggested. 
E. THE STORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH AN IMPLEMENTED 
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SAFETY, AN ACHIEVED SAFETY 
CULTURE, AND AN EVER-IMPROVING ROADMAP 
Law enforcement will always be a high-risk profession. Both the risk and the 
profession can be impacted positively by implementing a systematic approach to safety. 
Professions such as the fire service and industries like medicine and aviation have proven 
the benefits of improving the safety environment of its employees by creating a safety 
culture. Law enforcement will be no exception. It is conceivable that when officers are 
better protected by safety systems, the need for even proper uses of force will diminish. 
Those threats that remain, and there will be many, will be understood and mitigated to the 
best of the system’s ability at the time. Improved safety gives officers time to think and 
                                                 
230 U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, “Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat 
Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence” (report, Secret 
Service, July 2018), 2, www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC_Enhancing_School_ 
Safety_Guide_7.11.18.pdf. 
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react in critical situations. Standards, documentation, and training allow best practices to 
be validated, repeated, and shared to benefit the entire profession.  
For law enforcement safety, the future is now. Elected officials, agency heads, 
academics, and line officers must not be impeded by traditions and traditional thinking that 
continue to impact officer safety. Agency heads can choose to follow the roadmap now or 
wait until civil attorneys and others leave them no choice. It will be a long road in the best 
of circumstances, and law enforcement never operates in the best of circumstances. A 
systematic approach to safety and the implementation of a safety culture is the right thing 
at the right time. The time is now. 
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